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INTRODUCTION
The Web site of the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") offers a
wealth of information to the curious visitor.' The site catalogues
every federal political contribution over $200 made by individual per-
sons, all cross-indexed and searchable by name, city, zip code, em-
ployer, and occupation. In just an hour in front of my home com-
puter, I used this resource to learn about the political beliefs of
friends, neighbors, professors at my college and law school alma ma-
ters, and employees of companies and law firms where I have worked.
To round out my exploration, I ran a search on the political dona-
tions of dentists in Peoria, Illinois, and found two Republican con-
tributors.
A largely unexamined consensus supports publicizing this infor-
mation about personal political contributions. As one pair of schol-
ars put it, disclosure is "fast becoming a Motherhood issue."3 Even in
the intensely bitter debate over campaign finance regulation, both
Law clerk, Hon. Sandra L. Lynch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 2002-2003;
J.D., 2002, New York University School of Law; B.A. in political science, 1992, Carleton College.
I am grateful to Richard Briffault for aiding this project from its inception, and to Rick Pildes
and Pat Schwartz for extremely helpful critiques. Thanks also to Jessica Songster and the
other editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law. Finally, I appreciate
the generous assistance of many others, including C. Edwin Baker, Theane Evangelis, Daveed
Gartenstein-Ross, Christine Kornylak, Shawn Larsen-Bright, Parvin Moyne, Ezra Reese, Gabriel
Ross, Clyde Wilcox, and, of course, Elizabeth Elliott McGeveran.
See http://www.fec.gov (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
2 The "advanced search" function providing this information can be reached by linking
from the FEC's home page, supra note 1, or by going directly to
http://herndonl.sdrdc.com/fecimg/advindsea.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2003). For more on
the rules surrounding disclosure, including the $200 threshold, see infra Part I.A.I BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN
FINANCE 5 (2002); see also Elizabeth Garrett, A New Paradign for Campaign Finance Reform: Voting
with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (2003) (observing the "gut reaction shared by most
commentators and voters" in favor of disclosure).
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sides support extensive disclosure of contributions . Libertarians who
wish to repeal limitations on the size of contributions would largely
replace these caps with even stronger disclosure rules.5 Reformers,
meanwhile, see disclosure as an important complement to other
regulations, praise existing disclosure rules, and seek to extend
them.6 It seems everyone subscribes to the famous aphorism from
Justice Brandeis that describes "sunlight" as "the best of disinfec-
tants."'
This consensus persists despite two countervailing legal trends.
First, there is rising concern in nearly every other area of the law
about information privacy) Scholars engage in lively discussion
about its possible social, legal, and constitutional dimensions." Con-
gress has enacted new protection for the confidentiality of records
about an individual's health care,'0 finances," and even video rent-
4 See Editorial, Campaign Reform Farce, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2002, at A24 ("Full and complete
disclosure of who gives how much to political campaigns is a concept embraced by everyone
from President Bush and Senator John McCain to many legislative enemies of campaign fi-
nance reform.").
See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance,
86 GEO. L.J. 45, 61-62 (1997) (calling fuller disclosure more appropriate and more narrowly
tailored campaign finance regulation than contribution limits). As one pair of proponents de-
scribes it:
In this scenario, disclosure laws would be broadened and strengthened, and penalties for
failure to disclose would be ratcheted up, while rules on other aspects-such as sources
of funds and sizes of contributions-could be greatly loosened or even abandoned alto-
gether .... [A] new disclosure regime mightjust prove to be the solution in itself.
LARRWJ. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 330 (1996) (proposing a "Deregulation Plus" model of "free market for
campaign finance").
6 See, e.g., COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: A BLUEPRINT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 97-98 (2000) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY] (mentioning disclosure as an
important tool and seeking an increase in disclosure of issue advocacy expenditures); Brooks
Jackson, Fixing the FEC: Suggestions for Change: Fulfilling the Promise, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 315, 321 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997) ("Nearly everyone agrees
that the most important campaign finance reform was accomplished. . . when Congress en-
acted the first serious requirement that candidates, parties, and political committees at the fed-
eral level disclose their incomes and expenses."). The McCain-Feingold Act, enacted in 2002,
included provisions to further expand the disclosure of individual campaign contributions. See
infra note 40 and accompanying text.
7 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE II" 92 (1932),
quoted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
8 References to "privacy" in this Article refer specifically to "data privacy" or "information
privacy"-people's ability to control the dissemination of personal information about them-
selves. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987
(2000) (discussing interactions between technology and privacy); Symposium, Modern Studies in
Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2002) (discussing privacy rights and laws generally); Sympo-
sium, Privacy, 68 SoC. RES. 3 (2001) (presenting interdisciplinary analyses of privacy).
10 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (-HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d
(2000) (authorizing regulations to protect the privacy of medical records).
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als. 2 Some of these initiatives encountered difficulties in implemen-
tation, 3 but the trajectory of policy concern points consistently to-
ward privacy. Information about campaign contributions is more eas-
ily available to the public than any of these other types of data, and
perhaps more sensitive, yet there is little sign of commensurate con-
cern about its privacy.
The second countervailing trend emerges in recent Supreme
Court decisions about anonymous political activity. McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission invalidated a state law requiring that election-
related communications include the sponsor's name and address. 4
When Mrs. Margaret McIntyre distributed unsigned leaflets opposing
a local school tax referendum, she was charged and fined.5 Because
11 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000) (requiring financial institutions
to announce certain uses of personal financial data and offer customers an opportunity to pre-
vent such uses).
12 Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2000) (prohibiting video rental
businesses from disclosing customers' records). For other examples of legislation passed in the
last decade to protect data privacy, see Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
6502-6505 (2000) (requiring parental consent for the collection of personal information about
minor children on the Web); Drivers' Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000),
upheld in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 541 (2000) (requiring state motor vehicle departments to
obtain affirmative consent from drivers before releasing personal data from records to market-
ers); Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, 609 (2000) (limiting telephone
company use of customers' personal data); see also I RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW
ch. 8 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing privacy and data protection law in the "digital age"); PAUL M.
SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA
PROTECTION (1996) (surveying federal and state data protection law); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Pri-
vacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1315-17 (2001) (surveying
state laws). Information privacy has also been the subject of at least one statewide referendum.
See infra note 242.
13 The original regulations for medical privacy were scaled back in response to negative re-
actions from some doctors and insurers. Compare Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifi-
able Health Information, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 160, 164), with Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
160, 164). See also Anne Barnard, Doctors Brace for Changes on Patient Privacy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
11, 2003, at Al (discussing doctors' reactions to Department of Health and Human Services
rules requiring healthcare workers to disclose minimal amounts of patient information to each
other and to describe privacy protections to patients); HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, SUMMARY OF
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1, Sept. 13, 2002, at http://www.healthprivacy.org/
usrdoc/RegSummary2002.pdf (noting that Congress failed to pass comprehensive health pri-
vacy regulation, which forced the Department of Health and Human Services to issue health
privacy regulations). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial privacy requirements, see supra note 11,
have been criticized for ineffectiveness. See Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1230-32
(2002) (noting industry leaders and private advocates' disappointment with the Act); John
Schwartz, Privay Notices are Called Too Common and Too Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at Al
(reporting on the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the Act's requirements for privacy protec-
tion).
14 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 338 & n.3 (1995) (describing the Ohio
statute in question).
15 Id. at 337-38.
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of Mrs. McIntyre's interest in retaining privacy while engaging in "the
essence of First Amendment expression" -pamphleteering-the
Court held that she had a "right to remain anonymous." 7 In 2002,
the Court strongly reaffirmed the right to anonymity in Watchtower Bi-
ble and Tract Society, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, which overturned a town
ordinance requiring door-to-door canvassers to register with the town
and obtain a permit.1 The majority opinion relied heavily on McIn-
tyre and found that the right to anonymity outweighed the asserted
government interests in 9 reventing fraud and crime and protecting
residents from intrusion. The Supreme Court has also conferred a
right of anonymity on politically-oriented expression in a number of
other cases. Lower courts have applied McIntyre to anonymous
speech in a variety of contexts.2 ' As with the first trend, however, the
trend of increasing solicitude toward anonymity has not extended to
campaign contributions-indeed, so far the Supreme Court has stu-
diously stopped short of that result.2
16 Id. at 347.
17 Id. at 357.
is 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
9 Id. at 166-69.
20 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 197-200 (1999) (invali-
dating a law requiring that persons who circulate petitions for placing referendum questions on
a ballot mtst wear identification badges revealing their names); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 65 (1960) (invalidating a law requiring all leaflets distributed in the city to contain the name
and address of the author or sponsor); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (in-
validating a local ordinance requiring reporting of "dues, assessments, and contributions" paid
to organizations); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-67 (1958) (ruling against compelled
reporting of NAACP membership lists); see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982) (protecting contributions to and expenditures by a socialist
political party from disclosure and reporting); infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing
Socialist Workers).
21 See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (2d Cir. 2000) (invali-
dating a state issue advocacy disclosure requirement); Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v.
Kerik, 232 F. Supp. 2d 205, 211-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (overturning a state law that prohibited
wearing masks at public gatherings); ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(granting a preliminary injunction against a state law interpreted as a ban on anonymous and
pseudonymous Internet communication); Doe v. Texas, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 88, at *3
(Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2003) (invalidating state issue advocacy disclosure requirements). But
see, e.g., FEC v. Pub. Citizen, 268 F.3d 1283, 1287-91 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (rejecting the
argument that McIntyre renders the express advocacy disclosure requirements of 2 U.S.C. §
441d(a) unconstitutional); cf Frank v. City of Akron, 303 F.3d 752, 753 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that a city ordinance requiring disclo-
sure of contributors' home addresses was inconsistent with McIntyre's protection of anonymous
political expression).
The Brennan Center forJustice filed an amicus brief in Watchtower asking that the Justices
use the case to "clarify" that campaign finance disclosure rules "do not violate the First
Amendment as long as pamphleteers and other advocates engaged in face-to-face communica-
tions are exempt." Brief of Amicus Curiae Brennan Center forJustice at 18, Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (No. 00-1737). At the Watchtower oral
argument, Justice Breyer asked whether overruling the town ordinance would cast doubt on
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This Article explores the tension between the consensus and these
legal trends that point in the opposite direction. Why do we fret
about the exposure of sensitive personal information, but require the
government to announce individuals' political affiliations throughout
cyberspace? Why do we grant Mrs. McIntyre complete anonymity in
her modest pamphlets, but require complete disclosure should she
write a modest check instead? I conclude that the tension, now
thoughtlessly resolved in favor of disclosure, is actually more com-
plex. As a result, parts of the current disclosure regime, especially
with respect to smaller contributions made by individuals, face consti-
tutional and policy objections.
Because of the focus on personal privacy, this Article concerns
only those contributions made by individuals to candidates, political
parties, or political action committees ("PACs") . Existing scholar-
ship and case law largely ignore the privacy problems inherent in dis-
closure of individual contributions, although there has been some re-
cent attention to disclosure rules that apply chiefly to expenditures by
groups. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("McCain-
Feingold Act") requires disclosure of the sponsorship of advertise-
campaign contribution disclosure. Oral Argument Transcript at 15, Watchtower, 536 U.S. 150
(No. 00-1737), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument_tran-
scripts.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2003). See also Francis X. Clines, Ohio Village Pleads its Case for a
No-Pitch Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at A16 ("The justices' questions suggested that their
ultimate concern involved how to uphold the free-speech right to anonymous door-to-door
canvassing without limiting the government's right to require disclosure of campaign
contributors' identities."). The Watchtower opinion ultimately sidestepped the issue, except for
one line asserting that the facts in that case did not concern "any special interest in protecting
the electoral process." 536 U.S. at 167. Justice Breyer's separate concurrence ignored the
question. See id. at 169-71 (Breyer,J., concurring). In McIntyre, too, some of theJustices seemed
uneasy about the possible extension of anonymity to campaign contributions. The majority
opinion attempted to distinguish campaign contributions, see McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 354-56 (1995), although I will argue later that the effort failed, see infra
notes 125-37 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg went further in McIntyre, filing a short
concurrence to emphasize that the anonymity precedent might not apply in "other, larger
circumstances," perhaps including contribution disclosure. 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); see infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (discussing Ginsburg's
concurrence).
23 Disclosure of a contribution made by a group (such as a PAC, political party, or tax-
exempt organization) to a candidate does not itself implicate the kinds of personal interest de-
scribed in Parts I.B-C-provided, of course, that the people who gave money to the group re-
main anonymous. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the NAACP did
not have to disclose membership lists); see also FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2210 n.8
(2003) (finding restrictions on corporate contributions less troublesome under the First
Amendment than restrictions on individual contributions because restrictions on corporations
leave their individual members free to contribute on their own). Supreme Court anonymity
cases have been particularly concerned about individuals and vulnerable groups. See Watchtower,
536 U.S. at 162-63 (emphasizing marginalization of plaintiff Jehovah's Witnesses); Trevor Pot-
ter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure and the First Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REv. 71, 104 (1999)
(noting "sympathetic" and small-scale plaintiffs who prevailed in McIntyre, American Constitu-
tional Law Foundation, and Socialist Workers).
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ments defined as "electioneering communications., 24 This provision
aims at "issue advocacy"-advertisements that avoid expressly advocat-
ing the election or defeat of a candidate and were thus exempt from
25prior federal campaign finance laws. The problem has been ana-
lyzed by both courts26 and scholars.17 There has also been discussion
of a less prominent statute, which amended the tax code to require
greater disclosure of political speech by tax-exempt groups .2  For the
most part, however, both of these debates center on disclosure of po-
litical activity by groups, so they do not implicate any of the personal
privacy interests that would be of concern to an individual like Mrs.
McIntyre. In addition, they consider expenditures rather than con-
24 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88-89.
25 The loophole originated in the famous "magic words" footnote of Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) ("restrict[ing] the application of [part of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971] to communications containing express words of advocacy of elec-
tion or defeat"). See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE McLOUGHLIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
BUYING TIME: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 22-27,
http://www.brennancenter.org (2001) (tracing the history of the issue advocacy loophole).
26 See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted,
123 S. Ct. 2268 (2003) (mem.) (considering provisions in McCain-Feingold Act). The effect of
the badly fragmented McConnell decision, which would alter the McCain-Feingold Act in bizarre
ways, has been stayed pending Supreme Court review. See McConnell v. FEC, 253 F. Supp. 2d
18, 20 (D.D.C. 2003). Courts have also considered numerous state law issue advocacy disclosure
requirements. See, e.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003)
(upholding the narrow construction of a state issue advocacy disclosure law); Vt. Right to Life
Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (2d Cir. 2000) (invalidating a state issue advocacy disclo-
sure requirement); Doe v. State, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 88; at *3-*4 (Tex. Crim. App. May
14, 2003) (invalidating a similar statute).
27 See Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue Advocacy, " and Buckley v. Valeo: A
Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285, 288-92 (2000); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy:
Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1751 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring
Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws
Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773 (2001) [hereinafter Hasen, Measuring Over-
breadth]; Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expendi-
tures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000) [hereinafter Hasen, Complex
Case]; Potter, supra note 23; Andrew Pratt, Comment, The End of Sham Issue Advocacy: The Case to
Uphold Electioneering Communications in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1663 (2003).
28 Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of I.R.C.). Several commentators have discussed the statute's disclosure requirement. See
Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611
(2003) (arguing that Congress may condition a political organization's tax-exempt status on the
organization's willingness to comply with Section 527's disclosure provisions); David S. Karp,
Note, Taxing Issues: Reexamining the Regulation of Issue Advocacy by Tax-Exempt Organizations
Through the Internal Revenue Code, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805 (2002) (arguing that Section 527
should be limited to groups engaged in express advocacy); see also Susan Crabtree, Congress
Tweaks 527 Law, ROLL CALL, Oct. 21, 2002, at I (describing technical revisions in a law enacted
with bipartisan support). One commentator has proposed a more dramatic change in the tax
code, requiring disclosure of contributors, including individuals, who give money to "think
tanks" organized under § 501 (c) (3). See Note, The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for
Mandatory Contributor Disclosure, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1502 (2002) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
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tributions, changing the constitutional analysis in important ways.29 A
recent proposal by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres to replace manda-
tory disclosure of contributions with mandatory anonymity has also
generated debate, but neither the authors nor their critics focus on
privacy in particular. ° If unthinking support for disclosure is wide-
spread, silence about its privacy costs is nearly universal.
Buckley v. Valeo upheld the disclosure of individual campaign con-
tributions on the theory that its benefits outweigh its costs. 2 But the
characterization of these benefits and costs must now be reconsid-
ered in light of new technology, increased concern for privacy, and
the realities of modem campaigns. Part I of this Article, after a brief
description of current disclosure rules, examines the privacy-related
costs of disclosure and finds them more significant than the consen-
sus recognizes. Part II moves to the other side of the scale and con-
cludes that the purported benefits of disclosure have been overesti-
mated, especially in the case of comparatively small contributions.
This reassessment of costs and benefits calls into question the
conventional wisdom favoring disclosure. Part III considers the con-
stitutional ramifications of this adjusted balance between costs and
benefits. A vague standard of review and an inclination to defer to
the legislature might allow courts to avoid striking down the current
disclosure regime. But they should find the dissonance between that
result and the new jurisprudence on anonymous political activity to
be uncomfortable.
Part IV moves from the constitutional question to the policy issue.
Whether or not courts strike down disclosure rules as unconstitu-
tional, an improved understanding of privacy costs suggests that ex-
cessive disclosure is an unwise policy. None of this analysis requires
the end of all contribution disclosure. Far from it, the Article con-
29 See infra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing the crucial distinction between
expenditures and contributions under Buckley v. Valeo).
so ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3; see also Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth:
Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998)
(offering an earlier version of the "secret donation booth" proposal). For a broad overview of
the response to Ackerman and Ayres, see The Brennan CenterJorde Symposium on Constitutional
Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 641 (2003); Symposium, Commentaries on Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres's Vot-
ing with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance Reform, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 35
(2003). See also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Voting with Votes, 116 HARV. L. REV 1971 (2003) (book
review). The Ackerman and Ayres proposal is discussed further in notes 250-53 and accompa-
nying text.
31 I have only found three commentaries that devote more than superficial attention to indi-
vidual privacy concerns. See Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of
Voting with Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REV. 643, 655 (2003) (reviewing ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note
3); Garrett, supra note 3, at 1043-44; Harvard Note, supra note, at 1523.
32 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that three state interests
supporting disclosure outweigh donors' First Amendment interests in keeping contributions
private).
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cludes by suggesting some possible regimes for disclosure that retain
its important virtues while better respecting privacy. I urge merely a
recalibration of the cost-benefit scale to give greater weight to an in-
dividual's interest in keeping personal political convictions private.
At a minimum, the disclosure of smaller contributions deserves
more careful consideration than it now receives. When one remem-
bers that many individual contributors are idealistic "Mrs. Mclntyres"
who donate modest sums of money to support their favorite causes,
disclosure takes on a different appearance than the conventional
consensus recognizes. The current failure even to acknowledge pri-
vacy costs conceals the trade off required by disclosure and leads to
an unreflective assumption that privacy invasions are easily justified
by the civic virtue of "sunlight."0
3
I. PRIVACY COSTS
In order to evaluate the privacy costs exacted by campaign contri-
bution disclosure laws, we must first know what they require, so Part
L.A reviews them in brief. The remainder of this Part explores the
privacy costs that result.
A. The Current Disclosure Regime
Just a small percentage of American adults-not more than one in
ten-makes political contributions.m Contrary to widespread percep-
tion, most of these contributions are modest donations of a few hun-
dred dollars." Other types of highly visible political spending may in-
3s SeeGarrett, supra note 3, at 1011 ("As is often the case with gut reactions, this one needs to
be critically assessed. Disclosure is not costless.").
See National Election Studies, Center For Political Studies, University of Michigan, The
NFS Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, at http://www.umich.edu/
-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab6b_5.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2003) [hereinafter NES Studies].
The NES survey has asked slightly different versions of essentially the same question concerning
political contributions for many years. Since 1980, between 6 and 10 percent of respondents say
they have made such a contribution; 7 percent did so in 1998 and 9 percent in 2000. Id. The
NES Studies also breaks out results by race, gender, income group, education level, and other
socioeconomic indicators, as well as by partisan and ideological affiliation. Id. See also John
Green et al., Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy, Conservative, and Reform-
Minded, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/donors/donors.asp (June 9, 1998) (reporting the
results of a 1997 survey concentrating on contributors' reasons for giving and opinions on the
campaign finance system).
In fact, extrapolating from FEC data, it appears that the number of contributions to can-
didates of under $200 is over twice the number of those over $750. In the 1999-2000 election
cycle, individual contributions of less than $200 to congressional candidates totaled
$169,289,822. See Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Reports Congressional Financial Activity for 2000, at
http://www.fec.gov/press/051501congfinact/051501congfinact.html (May 15, 2001). Using an
unrealistically conservative assumption that all contributions in this category were $199 each,
that still would mean that there were at least 850,703 contributions of this size. In contrast, in-
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volve larger amounts, such as money provided by corporations, un-
ions, and interest groups36 or unlimited independent expenditures by
millionaires.3 ' But these do not implicate quite the same privacy con-
cerns as modest checks written by individual donors to campaigns or
causes they personally support.
Disclosure has been a cornerstone of campaign finance regulation
for almost a century, dating at least to the federal Publicity of Political
Contributions Act of 1910.38 More recently, reformers turned to a
disclosure strategy when enacting the issue advocacy and tax code
provisions mentioned earlier,39 as well as certain small expansions of
disclosure rules for individual contributions in the McCain-Feingold
Act.4 The principal federal provisions requiring disclosure of indi-
vidual contributions were enacted as part of the 1974 amendments to
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").
4
1
dividual contributions of $750 or more totaled $250,825,446. Id. Using an equally unrealistic
assumption that all these contributions were at the very bottom of the range, $750, then no
more than 334,433 contributions were at this level. This somewhat crude extrapolation is nec-
essary because contributions under $200 are not reported to the FEC individually.
36 This is mostly the infamous soft money that the McCain-Feingold Act aims to curb. Of
course, most of this money originally came from individuals. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al.,
Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics, 17J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 108 (2003) (estimating that,
in the 2000 elections, individuals gave $1.1 billion to candidates, $700 million to parties, and
$600 million to PACs, for a total of $2.4 billion in individual contributions; only $380 million
originated directly from the treasuries of unions, corporations, and trade associations; $235 mil-
lion came from public funding). Corporations and unions have long been barred from con-
tributing to candidates directly. See Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, § 304 (1947) (ban-
ning direct contributions to candidates by labor unions); Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat.
864 (1907) (imposing similar restrictions on corporations and national banks).
37 One such expenditure, which received a great deal of attention, was a television adver-
tisement attacking John McCain's environmental record in the 2000 presidential primaries,
funded by over two million dollars from Sam and Charles Wyly, Texas financiers who supported
the candidacy of George W. Bush. Edward Walsh & Terry M. Neal, McCain Hits TVAd Blitz from
Texas, Voters Are Urged to Condemn Bush Backers' "Dirty Money,"WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2000, at A20.
38 36 Stat. 822 (1910). This statute, the first federal campaign finance disclosure law, re-
quired post-election disclosure of national parties' contributions and expenditures. Id. The
campaign for its passage began in 1904. See David Adamany, The Unaccountability of Political
Money, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
95, 96-97 (Margaret Latus Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990) (noting that the National
Publicity Bill Organization was formed in 1904 to encourage disclosure of campaign contribu-
tions); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61-63 (1976) (per curiam) (describing the history of
campaign finance disclosure laws). Disclosure laws enacted before 1974 were ineffective and
therefore largely "symbolic." Briffault, supra note 31, at 651-52.
39 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
40 See Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 306, 501-503, 116 Stat. 81, 102, 114-15 (2002) (establishing
standards for software to allow more rapid disclosure of contributions on the Internet, expand-
ing access to records on the Internet, and requiring additional disclosure reports by campaigns
and national political parties); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 Reporting, 68 Fed.
Reg. 404 (Jan. 3, 2003) (promulgating final rules to implement these provisions).
41 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000)).
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Under FECA, candidates for federal office, and PACs that donate
to such candidates, must submit regular reports about the contribu-
tions they have received and the expenditures they have made. Can-
didates must list individual contributors who give them over $200 in
one election cycle, along with their address, occupation, and em-
ployer. PACs must provide the same information about individuals
who contribute over $200 in any calendar year.4 2 The $200 threshold
has not changed since 1980, when it was raised from the $100 level
originally set in 1974.43
Most states impose even stricter disclosure provisions for nonfed-
eral elections." Almost all require campaigns to itemize contribu-
tions below the federal threshold of $200. Eight states set thresholds
as low as $20 or $25, and several others require reporting of all con-
tributions, no matter what their size.46
Before the rise of the Internet, data on these disclosed contribu-
tions was available to the public in theory, but difficult to obtain in
practice. A curious journalist or voter needed to travel in person to
an election agency office and rummage through piles of paper re-
ports arranged in filing cabinets.47 One could not search, sort, aggre-
42 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2000); 11 C.F.R. 104.3(a)(4)(i) (2002). The requirement to
identify individuals by their name, address, occupation, and employer is found in 2 U.S.C. §
431(13) (A) (2000).
See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 104, 93
Stat. 1339, 1348 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455) (amending § 304(b) (3) (A) of FECA).
The law revised aspects of FECA which, after the experience of a few election cycles, were con-
sidered administratively burdensome. Privacy was not a motivating factor for the increase in the
threshold. An earlier version of the bill left the $100 level in place. SeeH.R. REP. No. 96-422, at
18 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2878.
44 The FEC publishes a summary of state campaign finance laws, which is assembled by out-
side contractors. See EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 2000: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH QUICK
REFERENCE CHARTS (2000). Another good source of information about state laws is the Cam-
paign Finance Information Center's Web site, which includes summaries of campaign finance
disclosure rules in every state. State Campaign Finance Search, at
http://www.campaignfinance.org/states/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
See generally FEIGENBAUM & PALMER, supra note 44, at chart 1. The only exceptions, ac-
cording to this compilation, are Mississippi ($200), North Dakota ($200), Nebraska ($250), and
New Jersey ($300). Id.
46 The eight states are Arizona ($25), Colorado ($25), Michigan ($20), New Hampshire
($25), Ohio ($25, but higher for in-kind contributions), Washington ($25), Wisconsin ($20),
and Wyoming ($25); the District of Columbia requires disclosure at the $10 level. Id. The
states that have no threshold (although the fine print of the law sometimes limits disclosure in
other ways) are Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, and West Virginia. Id. New Mexico allows con-
tributors to give up to $100 to a candidate anonymously-that is, without even the candidate
knowing their identity. Id. at NM-i (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-19-26(Q), 1-19-34(B), 1-19-
34(D)). A handful of other states allow small anonymous contributions, but since the permissi-
ble amounts are below the disclosure thresholds in those states, they make no difference for the
privacy of the contributor. See id. at chart 2-B.
S47See CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE, WEBSITE WOES: THE FEDERAL NON-
SYSTEM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 5, http://www.cfinst.org/disclosure/
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gate, or analyze these documents in the ways we take for granted
when using a computerized database.48 While my search for Peoria
dentists yielded immediate results on the FEC Web site, it would be
almost impossible to conduct in a huge file room arranged by candi-
date or contributor name rather than by profession or geography.
Even when election officials first began computerizing their files, of-
ten the general public still needed to visit an election agency office
and search the resulting database using a terminal there.49
Because of combined cultural and technological forces, we now
live in an age when everyone from prospective employers to prospec-
tive dates conducts do-it-yourself background checks with Internet
search engines.0 Dramatically increased computerization has created
digitized archives of personal data that are larger, more publicly ac-
cessible, and more easily searched and analyzed than ever before.5'
In the last five years, campaign contribution disclosure suddenly
joined the trend of online compilation and availability.52 This change
in technology qualitatively transformed the nature of disclosure laws.
No longer can a contributor assume that disclosed information is
pdf/websitewoes.pdf (Oct. 2002) ("As late as 1996, the major source of public information on
money in federal elections was the small FEC Public Records office in Washington, DC. A visi-
tor could laboriously examine and, for a fee, copy microfilmed campaign finance re-
ports....").
48 See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & ROBERT M. STERN, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, ACCESS
DELAYED IS ACCESS DENIED: ELECTRONIC REPORTING OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACTIVITY 14-15,
http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/Public Disclosure.pdf (Dec. 2001) (detailing electronic
filing procedures). The authors describe the process of drawing useful information from such
paper reports as "slow, mathematically consuming, and tending towards inaccuracies." Id. at 20.
49 Id. at 17. Alternately, some states allowed members of the public to obtain the database
on a computer disk. Id. at 17-18.
See Kathryn Balint, I Surf Therefore I Am: Finding Yourself-Literally--on the Pages of the Web,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 5, 2000, Computer Link Section, at 6 (describing the danger that
employers will find adverse information about a job applicant-or someone with an identical
name-by surfing the Web); Kris Maher, The Jungle, WALL ST.J., July 16, 2002, at B1O (quoting a
job searching expert, referring to popular search engine, "I can just about promise you that an
employer will Google you"); Deborah Schoeneman, Don't Be Shy Ladies-Google Him!, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Jan. 15, 2001, at 1 (chronicling a trend among Manhattan singles of investigating the
background of their dates using a search engine); Neil Swidey, A Nation of Voyeurs, BOSTON
GLOBE MAG., Feb. 2, 2003, at 11 (profiling Google and its cultural impact).
51 SeeJerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99
(1998) (noting the increased access to information placed on the Web, because "data gener-
ated in cyberspace are detailed, computer-processable, indexed to the individual, and perma-
nent"); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic
Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 473-74 (2000) (discussing the "virtually limitless possibilities for
compiling, analyzing, and systematizing" digitized personal data).
52 See HOLMAN & STERN, supra note 48, at 17-18 (describing the sudden surge in the avail-
ability of campaign finance disclosures on the Internet starting in 1998).
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unlikely to be seen by anyone. 3 The law may remain the same, but its
effect is entirely different.
54
Many government election agencies pursue their disclosure mis-
sion with vigor. The FEC has called providing information about
campaign contributions "perhaps the most important of the FEC's
duties."' It publishes a large directory of federal and state agencies
that disclose information about "money in politics," including data
on campaign contributions. 6 As noted earlier, the FEC's Web site in-
cludes a fairly elaborate search engine, where a visitor can look up
any person's reported federal contributions by searching for name,
city, state, zip code, employer, or occupation.57 According to one
comprehensive survey conducted in 2002, forty-six states and four
major cities also provide online public access to campaign finance
materials.5s
After the government makes this information conveniently avail-
able, private entities and the news media disseminate it further.
Various independent advocacy groups use disclosure data to create
sophisticated online databases of individual contributors. 59 These or-
53 The FEC's Web site had 146,113 visits in April 2002; the disclosure Web site maintained by
the Center for Responsive Politics, see infra note 59, had 188,278 visitors in the same month.
CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 46, at 6.
54 One example of the use of contribution data may be particularly noteworthy to readers of
this Article: one study analyzed the contribution patterns of law school faculty to reach conclu-
sions about their ideological makeup, by school and subject matter. SeeJohn 0. McGinnis and
Matthew Schwartz, Commentary, Conservatives Need Not Apply, WALL ST.J., April 1, 2003, at A14.
55 Fed. Election Comm'n, Administering and Enforcing the FECA, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 293, 294 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997), available at
httpi//www.fec.gov/pages/20year.htm [hereinafter FEC Twenty-Year Report].
Fed. Election Comm'n, Combined Federal/State Disclosure and Election Directory 2003,
http-://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfsdd/cfsdd.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
- See http://www.fec.gov (last visited Aug. 24, 2003); supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
For a critique of this site, see generally CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE, supra
note 47, at 8-25.
Ctr. for Governmental Studies, Electronic Filing and Disclosure Survey: 2002 Update 9,
http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/2002SurveyResults.pdf (last visited July 27, 2003); see
HOLMAN & STERN, supra note 48, at 5, 31 n.4 (providing results of 1996 and 2000 surveys). The
cities are Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle; Austin, Texas and Madison, Wis-
consin also post scanned disclosure forms online. The only states that do not post significant
data online are Montana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Ctr. for Governmental Studies,
supra at 9.
Organizations that place large privately created contributor databases on the Internet in-
clude the Campaign Finance Information Center, sponsored by the University of Missouri
School of Journalism, which allows registered users to conduct a "power search" of contribu-
tions in most states, at http://www.campaignfinance.org (last visited July 27, 2003); the Center
for Responsive Politics, which offers data on individuals' federal contributions, including search
functions by zip code, at http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited July 27, 2003); Common
Cause, which provides data on the unrestricted "soft money" contributions to political parties
now targeted by the McCain-Feingold Act, Soft Money Laundromat, at
http://www.commoncause.org/laundromat (last visited July 27, 2003); and the National Insti-
tute on Money in State Politics, a foundation-funded entity in Helena, Montana that provides
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ganizations often add their own research to the information they ob-
tain through government-mandated disclosure. Many of them use
coding systems to convey more information, such as one developed
by the Center for Responsive Politics to classify contributors' occupa-
tions; this coding process is known as "fingerprinting" contributors. °
The National Institute of Money in State Politics augments public
disclosure records by identifying the occupations, employers, and
economic interests of individual contributors.61
This combination of campaign finance disclosure law, govern-
ment administrative practices, and new technology makes informa-
tion about individual political contributions much more widely and
easily available than, say, medical or financial data.62 Contribution in-
formation is also more readily available than it was in 1976 when the
63regime was upheld in Buckley v. Valeo. As one author has com-
mented, giving a political donation now requires "broadcasting my
beliefs to anyone who has a modem."
64
B. How Disclosure Impinges on Privacy
In his separate opinion in Buckley, Chief Justice Burger protested
that the Court's analysis of disclosure rules paid too little attention to
the privacy of individual contributors who made modest donations:
"The public right to know ought not to be absolute when its exercise
reveals private political convictions. ''65 His instinct about the trade off
between disclosure and privacy was correct. Recent technological de-
velopments make disclosed data far more accessible and only inten-
databases of contributions to many state campaigns, at http://www.followthemoney.org (last
visited July 27, 2003). State-based advocacy organizations also offer databases about contribu-
tions in some individual states. See, e.g., Virginia Public Access Project, at http://www.vpap.org
(last visitedJuly 27, 2003).
See LARRY MAKINSON, excerpts from THE FOLLOW THE MONEY HANDBOOK (1994),
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs (last visited July 27, 2003) (explaining a technique for using
an occupational classification system).
61 The National Institute on Money in State Politics, About the Database: How the Data are Com-
piled, at http://www.followthemoney.org (last visitedJuly 27, 2003).
62 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (canvassing the legal protection for medical,
financial, and other personal data).
63 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam).
rA Fred Bernstein, Op-Ed, An Online Peek at Your Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A35.
424 U.S. at 237 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ironically, Bur-
ger held precisely the opposite view when the Buckley Court began its consideration of the case.
See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION L.J. 241, 244 1&
n.11 (2003) (reporting that internal memos show Burger's early support for FECA's disclosure
provisions); id. at 246 (quoting ChiefJustice Burger as writing in a memo that "[n]othing could
be more wholesome and consistent with our tradition as an open society" than FECA's disclo-
sure rules).
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sify this concern. But current doctrine and conventional views con-
tinue to place too little value on the privacy costs of disclosure.
"Information privacy" (or "data privacy") can be defined broadly
as one's ability to control the dissemination of personal information.6°
This basic definition leaves several specific issues open, such as the
meaning of the term "personal information," the nature and degree
of control an individual should have, and the duration of that con-
trol . But it is adequate for this Article, because the disclosure rules
analyzed here give an individual contributor no control at all over in-
formation about the clearly personal and sensitive topic of political
convictions. Under any definition, these rules curtail information
privacy. The question is how much, and at what cost.
While this issue arose in Buckley, it was hardly the core of the case.
Contribution disclosure consumes only about twenty-five of the per
curiam opinion's 144 pages in the United States Reports.68 The Su-
preme Court was much more concerned with other questions, such
as the legitimacy of FECA's caps on campaign expenditures. The ap-
pellants also stipulated that disclosure was less restrictive than the
other provisions of FECA, and the Court accepted this determination,
focusing the inquiry elsewhere. 69 Finally, Buckley was considered on
an accelerated schedule and drafted by multiple Justices, making• - 70
careful attention to a subsidiary issue even less realistic.
W See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as "the claim of in-
dividuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others"); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Consti-
tution,James Madison Lecture On Constitutional Law (Oct. 22, 2001), in 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245,
261 (2002) (defining privacy as "the power to 'control information about oneself'") (quoting
M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 228 (1995)); Kang, supra note 51, at 1205 (defining
"information privacy" as "an individual's claim to control the terms under which personal in-
formation ... [is] used"); William McGeveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web
Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1816 n.19 (2001) (adopting and defending this definition);
see also United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 763 (1989) (opening a discussion of privacy under the Freedom of Information Act by not-
ing "both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's
control of information concerning his or her person").
67 A number of scholars question the usefulness of control-based definitions because of vari-
ous constraints on choice, including the inability to recognize the full implications of sacrificing
privacy. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 32-41 (2001);Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at
"Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003-38 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz,
Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 821-34 (2000). That debate is beyond the
scope of this Article; in the context of campaign contributions, as I note in the text, the lack of
information privacy is manifest under any definition, including even the "control" paradigm
that these scholars view as too lenient in other contexts.
424 U.S. at 60-84.
Id. at 60, 68 & n.81. The Court speaks of corruption as the government interest at this
point of the opinion, but later expands to the three interests described in Part II: information,
corruption, and enforcement.
70 See Hasen, supra note 65, at 249-51 (detailing the Buckley opinion's drafting history).
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Operating within this context, the Buckley Court construed infor-
mation privacy narrowly indeed. It recognized only one individual
privacy interest that might outweigh the government's interests in
disclosure-the risk of outright harassment of a contributor as re-
taliation for the views expressed by a contribution.7 ' The Court in-
terpreted this danger in the shadow of cases where it had protected
the anonymity of NAACP members in the segregated south.72  The
cost of disclosure in these cases included such consequences as
",economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility.' 73 As in other instances
where the Supreme Court responded to bigotry in the Civil Rights
era, however, the relevance of these decisions may be confined to the
extraordinary circumstances that gave rise to them.4 Certainly,
contributors to a typical present-day political campaign do not suffer
the same costs from disclosure that southern desegregationists did in
the 1950s and 1960s. Buckley contemplated that costs would outweigh
benefits only when they were truly enormous.
The decision limited its recognition of privacy costs in other ways
as well. It placed the burden on the contributor to prove this high. . .. .. 75
level of injury in order to avoid disclosure requirements. Further-
more, the Court indicated that even such serious injury needed to be
paired with diminished government interests on the other side of the
scale, which could be shown only by contributors to "a minor party
with little chance of winning an election. 76 Solely in the case of such
fringe candidates would "the state interest furthered by disclosure
71 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68-74.
72 E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
73 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 69 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462). Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in McIntyre, which relied principally on arguments about original constitutional intent, also
cited this case law concerning "peculiar circumstances" and protested that, in contrast, there
was "not even a hint that Mrs. Mclntrye feared 'threats, harassment, or reprisals.'" McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 379-80 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis re-
moved).
74 Cf Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (allowing state intervention to prevent a private
all-white group from exercising de facto control over Democratic nominations for offices in
then heavily Democratic Texas). This case has by no means created broad precedent for other
interventions into the internal workings of political parties. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (invalidating a California blanket primary law); Eu v. S.F. County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (invalidating a statute that prohibited political
parties from expressing support for specific candidates prior to primaries); Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (invalidating a closed primary law).
75 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71-72 ("But no appellant in this case has tendered record evidence of
the sort proffered in NAACP v. Alabama."); id. at 74 ("Where it exists the type of chill and har-
assment identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown."). In addition to its stringency, this re-
quirement ignores the inherent contradiction of engaging in public litigation in order to main-
tain privacy-presumably after the harm of disclosure is already done.
76 Id. at 70.
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[be] so insubstantial that the Act's requirements [could not] be con-
stitutionally applied."" The Supreme Court found these precondi-
tions met in one later case concerning the Socialist Party,' but it is a
rare situation in which this extreme standard would put any weight at
all on the privacy side of the scale.
There are, however, many other legitimate reasons for people to
make political statements anonymously. As the Court explained in
McIntyre, "The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by
fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostra-
cism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as
possible."7 9 All of these penalties could apply to contributions.
There are two intertwined types of privacy costs, one consequen-
tial but concrete, the other more direct but more abstract. The con-
crete costs occur when disclosure leads to specific negative results for
the contributor. The NAACP members and socialists who are pro-
tected explicitly in current doctrine are extreme examples, but con-
tributors can suffer significant harm from disclosure in a variety of
other contexts. Individuals also have a direct but abstract interest in
shaping their identity in the world, rooted in rights of dignity and
autonomy.-s Control over personal information maximizes their
autonomy by increasing their ability to be the authors of their own
lives, at least as perceived by others. Loss of that control injures per-
sonal dignity because others learn information that is "none of their
business." I will arrange this discussion roughly from the most con-
crete costs to the more inchoate-but still important-autonomy and
dignity costs.
In his Buckley opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted perhaps the
most obvious direct penalty of disclosure-contributors to the losing
candidate may get a cold shoulder from the winner.s ' He also ex-
77 Id. at 71.
78 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101 (1982) (finding
unanimously that the party demonstrated "reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or re-
prisals" against contributors). This protection of privacy in a socialist political campaign was
itself an improvement over the Court's earlier precedents when, around the same time it was
protecting civil rights protestors, it approved of disclosure to root out "subversive" activity. See
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961), cited with approval in
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995); seeAlatchtower Bible &
Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002) (quoting this language from McIn-
tyre with approval).80 For examples of classic past efforts to define the dignity and autonomy interests protected
by data privacy, see generally WESTIN, supra note 66; Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Charles Fried, Privacy,
77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); Samuel D. War-
ren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
81 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 237 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Simi-
larly, potential contributors may well decline to take the obvious risks entailed in making a re-
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pressed concern about "[r]ank-and-file union members or rising jun-
ior executives" unwilling to defy their superiors' political preferences
with "even modest contributions."8 2 These situations present the pos-
sibility of very concrete penalties for those who contribute to the
"wrong" candidate or cause.
Disclosure of political contributions could also bear negative con-
sequences on many professions. Those who rely on trust and identi-
fication with others to do their work-such as ministers, psycho-
therapists, or schoolteachers-may find their roles undermined if
congregants, patients, or parents know and judge their personal po-
litical activity. Many media outlets impose a code of conduct on
journalists that requires them to avoid public political activity."
When one radio journalist found her $35 contribution to a guberna-
torial candidate reported in the local newspaper, she responded, "I
had asked [the candidate] to make it more anonymous .... I didn't
view it as a public endorsement.8 s4 The Model Code ofJudicial Ethics
also bans political contributions by judges, but allows private political
activity. 5 Both sets of rules aim to avoid the appearance of bias; they
do not actually suggest that journalists or judges lack private political
portable contribution to the opponent of a well-entrenched incumbent."). Republican lobby-
ists and conservative activists in Washington have worked together on the so-called "K Street
Project" to assemble a "bulky dossier" listing the past political contributions of lobbyists and
employees at trade associations and advocacy groups. Jim VandeHei, GOP Monitoring Lobbyists'
Politics, WASH. POST, June 10, 2002, at Al (noting the hope of the project's participants that Re-
publican officeholders will provide greater "access" to Republican contributors and shut out
Democratic contributors). As the congressman then in charge of Republican House campaigns
noted, "People often don't remember who gave them contributions. But they remember who
gave to their opponents." Id. (quoting Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA)).
82 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 237 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83 See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997) (upholding a newspa-
per's ability to penalize a reporter for participation in protests and other activism in violation of
the newspaper ethics code).
84 Bill Dedman,Journalists'Donations Raise Question of Conflict, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2002,
at BI (reporting contributions made by nineteen journalists in a Massachusetts gubernatorial
campaign which were publicized under state's expansive campaign disclosure law). The radio
journalist quoted above, a producer for the public radio program "Marketplace," reportedly
violated a station policy against "partisan activity by anyone who contributes editorial content."
Id.
85 Compare MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (A) (1) (e) (1990) (banning judges
from making political contributions) with id. at Canon 5 (A) cmt. 4 (clarifying that the ban on
public endorsements by judges "does not prohibit a judge ... from privately expressing his or
her views on judicial candidates or other candidates for public office"); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
(2003) (calling for disqualification when a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned"). The Canon barring contributions is different from the "announce clause" contained
in an earlier version of the Model Code and recently held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768, 773 n.5 (2002). Nonetheless,
it might be possible to read White broadly enough to call this Canon into question. Cf Spargo v.
N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 87-89 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying
partly on White to invalidate a state law, based on the Model Code, restricting "inappropriate
political activity").
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convictions. Were it possible, an anonymous political contribution
might be acceptable under such ethics codes. Similarly, if a gay do-
nor to the Log Cabin Republicans serves in the military, publication
of his contribution on the Internet could violate the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy and might well result in the end of his career.s7 Yet
by its own terms the military's rules would not ban the same contribu-
tion if it could be made in private. These professional penalties are a
significant deterrent against contributing for persons with few other
options for political expression.
Another negative consequence is the conversion of political in-
formation to unwanted commercial purposes. Those enjoying access
to contribution disclosure include data-mining companies that as-
siduously gather personal information and aggregate it into a de-
tailed profile of each American consumer88 Federal regulations sup-
posedly ban the use of disclosed contribution information for
commercial purposes or for solicitation of contributions by others. 9
Data on political giving nevertheless works its way into such perma-
nent profiles.9° Indeed, campaigns routinely "salt" their FEC reports
with phony donors, linked to the addresses of staff members, so that
they can track the misuse of the data by others. 9' This appropriation
of personal information for unwanted uses also implicates the digni-
tary interest in control. When medical information was diverted for
marketing, it stimulated a legislative and regulatory response that
recognized this dignitary interest.92
86 Cf White, 536 U.S. at 777-78 ("[I]t is virtually impossible to find ajudge who does not have
preconceptions about the law.").
87 See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998) (considering the case of a gay
sailor who discussed his sexual orientation in a seemingly anonymous online profile, only to
have it revealed to his military superiors, who pursued discharge against him); Edward Stein,
Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159,
199-202 (2003) (arguing that "closetspeech" is protected by the First Amendment because "gay
men and lesbians cannot enjoy free speech unless, when they speak as gay men or lesbians, they
are allowed to speak anonymously").
88 See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
164-68 (2000) (describing the data collection industry).
89 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.15 (2003) (prohibiting the sale or use for soliciting contributions of
any contribution information); FED. ELECTION COMM'N, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES AND COMMITTEES 39 (1999) (reproducing itemized receipt forms for campaign
contributions which state that "[a]ny information copied from such Reports and Statements
may not be used or sold.., for commercial purposes") [hereinafter FEC CAMPAIGN GUIDE].
90 See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Voter Profiles Selling Briskly as Privacy Issues are Raised, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2000, at Al (describing a company that provides detailed profiles of voters, including
information on their past political contributions). The campaigns use these profiles as well, for
such purposes as targeted Web advertising. Id.
91 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(e) (2003) (permitting a political committee to include up to ten
pseudonyms in its reports to the FEC); FEC CAMPAIGN GUIDE, supra note 89, at 39 (reproducing
itemized receipt forms).
92 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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As McIntyre noted, there are also dangers of "social ostracism.""
Charles Fried has argued that the formation of relationships, an es-
sential aspect of autonomy, requires that an individual control the se-
lective revelation of personal information to others. One can imag-
ine that people with opinions different from those prevalent among
their friends, family, or neighbors might choose not to reveal their
own ideology-or at least might want to control the timing and con-
tent of that revelation. Instead, a gay or lesbian person who wishes to
contribute to the Log Cabin Republicans risks being outed by FEC
reports. Likewise, anyone "googled" by nosy neighbors may have
their political convictions exposed.95 Political contributions label us,
and disclosure displays that label to others without our consent.
Forced revelations are intrusions into a sphere of personal liberty.
Significantly, the fragmentary information derived from disclosure
reports could be quite misleading: perhaps you donated to a conser-
vative religious group with which you have some disagreements in or-
der to support one of its agenda items, or gave to a liberal Democrat
went to school with him: Being subjected tobecause your brother tt.colwt i . n9ujetdt
such decontextualized judgments (or misjudgments) by others is a
further affront to personal dignity.97 Not only are you exposed to
others without consent, but the impressions they glean do not reflect
"the real you.,,
Finally, many Americans desire privacy even though they do not
face any concrete consequences of disclosure.98 For them, it is noth-
ing more than a legitimate preference to be left alone and to main-
tain control over, and distance from, their interactions with the
world. Such comparative hermits may sacrifice the ability to engage
in certain political activities, such as marching down Main Street in a
protest, because the physical fact of exposure in those situations re-
moves anonymity regardless of any legal rules. In two recent cases,
however, the Supreme Court has held that those who physically re-
veal themselves in the course of political expression are protected
93 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
94 Fried, supra note 80.
95 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Cf Richard L. Berke, A Senate Candidate's Refrain: Could You Stretch It to $500?, June 8,
2002, N.Y. TIMES, at Al (quoting a contributor to a Senate campaign who said "one of the pri-
mary reasons I contributed, frankly, was that I went to law school with [the candidate's] wife").
See generally Green et al., supra note 34 (discussing contributors' varied motives).
97 SeeJEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8-11
(2000) (discussing how people jump to conclusions about others based on personal data that is
incomplete or out of context).
98 As McIntyre put it, one might simply have "a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as
possible." 514 U.S. at 342.
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from legal requirements that erode their anonymity any further.99
The legal rules of contribution disclosure can be seen as even more
invasive because they mandate exposure where none would otherwise
occur.
Many political contributors do not object to the current legal re-
gime. Contributors are often politically active citizens who proudly
announce their ideological convictions in many other contexts al-
ready, from individual conversations to bumper stickers to volunteer-
ing for campaigns. But information privacy, as I have defined it here,
protects choice-and the opportunity to choose whether and how to
communicate one's political convictions is an important exercise of
autonomy. The elimination of anonymity in campaign contributions
results entirely from an intentional state action to govern conduct in
a particular way, rather than from any inevitable physical exposure;
with different rules, making contributions could be a means to par-
ticipate in politics for those who value their anonymity."
C. The Chilling Effect of Privacy Costs
The costs documented thus far are serious in their own right:
campaign finance disclosure may cause concrete harms when others
learn about an individual's political convictions, and, in any case, un-
wanted exposure infringes on personal autonomy and dignity. These
negative results of disclosure deserve more consideration in policy
debates. When the analysis turns to constitutional standards, how-
ever, these costs might have limited significance standing alone.
The Supreme Court has never clearly articulated an independent
constitutional right to information privacy. Even in 1977, at the exact
moment when the Court read substantive due process privacy rights
more expansively, 1 it unanimously rejected a claim in Whalen v. Roe
9 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002)
(finding that door-to-door canvassers retain an anonymity interest despite revealing themselves
on doorsteps); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (finding that a
person gathering petition signatures retains an anonymity interest).
100 In a not-so-different context, when First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone was provost
of the University of Chicago, he ensured that its laptop connections were configured so that the
school allowed users to plug in and remain anonymous, while other universities required regis-
tration that removed anonymity. Like the structure of computer systems, the rules of a cam-
paign finance system entail conscious choices that either allow or prohibit anonymity. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 25-29 (1999) (comparing the Univer-
sity of Chicago's "complete, anonymous, and free" Internet access to Harvard's highly con-
trolled access).101See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing a fundamental right to
marry); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (invalidating a ban on the dis-
tribution of contraceptives to minors for interfering with the "constitutionally protected right of
decision in matters of childbearing"); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (strik-
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that governmental accumulation of computerized personal data, in
itself, violated an autonomy-based constitutional privacy interest.'
°0 2
Perhaps this will change. There are persuasive arguments that the
autonomy interests in data privacy have strong constitutional moor-
ings of their own that courts should recognize, whether through due
process or other reasoning.0 3  Whalen itself may prove to be a less
formidable negative precedent than it first appears: there were spe-
cific safeguards against any public release of the information in that
case (prescriptions for certain pharmaceuticals with narcotic quali-
ties) and the Court suggested in dicta that a data privacy right "ar-
guably has its roots in the Constitution. ' 104
But even if courts remain skeptical of a freestanding constitutional
right to information privacy, they frequently invoke a more instru-
mental constitutional concern, the specter of a chilling effect. When
disclosure deters expression (and perhaps association) that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, it may violate the Constitution. Ear-
lier this year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied
on this constitutional difficulty when it prohibited the FEC from re-
leasing internal documents gathered during an investigation of the
Democratic Party and a labor union, accepting the claim that "releas-
ing the names of hundreds of volunteers, members, and employees
will make it more difficult for the organizations to recruit future per-
sonn el." 
°5
There is very little empirical evidence to determine how often or
how much the prospect of disclosure discourages would-be campaign
contributors.' 6 But the Supreme Court's anonymity cases require vir-
tually no empirical showing. In Watchtower, the Jehovah's Witnesses
who brought the case did not even object themselves to the surrender
ing down a zoning law for interference with extended family relationships); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (deriving the right to access to abortion from due process privacy rights).
102 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
103 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 67, at 1003-38 (1996) (arguing that data privacy rights are in-
herent in the First Amendment); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REv. 1609, 1647-66 (1999) (arguing that data privacy, because it is necessary for political dis-
course and exercise of constitutionally protected rights, should receive constitutional protec-
tion as a fundamental right); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection ofInforma-
tional Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 150-59 (1991) (arguing that data privacy is protected under
the Due Process Clause). Cohen and Schwartz also employ a more expansive understanding of
the scope of information privacy than the definition used in this Article. See supra note 67.
104 429 U.S. at 605. The safeguards mean that, while the government collected personal in-
formation, Whalen is not a true case of disclosure. For more on the distinction between report-
ing and disclosure requirements, see infta notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
105 AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
106 See Clyde Wilcox, Transparency and Disclosure in Political Finance: Lessons from the
United States 11-14 (June 2001) (unpublished presentation paper, on file with author) (citing
"anecdotal evidence" of a chilling effect on contributions); e-mail message from Clyde Wilcox
to author (Jan. 22, 2003) (on file with author).
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of anonymity required by the town; the Court essentially took judicial
notice of the risk that other canvassers might object to it.'0 7 Similarly,
it appears that Mrs. McIntyre omitted her name from her pamphlets
mistakenly, rather than as some principled decision to remain
anonymous.0 8  Again the Court recognized the possible chilling ef-
fect, rather than the particular deterrence of Mrs. McIntyre, and pro-
ceeded with an analysis based on that danger. Courts have, on their
own, found the denial of information privacy to cause a chilling effect
on political activity.'0 9 This judgment should extend easily to the in-
tuitively strong claim that the privacy costs outlined in Part I.B would
deter many contributors.'0
The chilling effect of privacy costs is likely to be uneven, and is
therefore more troubling than a government policy that deterred or
curtailed political speech of all types equally. One would predict that
the contributors who were chilled would fall into certain likely cate-
gories. First, aversion to public exposure particularly deters persons
from associating themselves with causes that are unpopular or un-
conventional."' This lopsided impact, favoring plain-vanilla candi-
dates and causes over others, distorts the marketplace of ideas and
further threatens First Amendment values. Second, it is not unrea-
sonable to suppose that marginalized persons with the most to lose
will be especially vulnerable to having their private ideology exposed
to public view.
107 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 n.14 (2002).
108 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that Mrs. McIntyre "placed her name on some of her fliers and meant to place it on all of
them").
109 See also AFL-CIO, 333 F.3d at 176 (accepting the claim in affidavits by AFL-CIO and De-
mocratic Party that disclosure of personal information about their volunteers, members, and
employees would discourage such recruits).
1 However, as discussed below, see infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text, the Supreme
Court may require less empirical evidence where campaign contributions are concerned. See
generally Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391-97 (2000) (holding that a state limit
on campaign contributions did not violate the First Amendment).
1 See Cohen, supra note 67, at 1003-38 (arguing that knowledge of being monitored or ex-
posed chills an individual's exploration of controversial content); Stein, supra note 87, at 191-92
(suggesting that because chilling effect is uneven, "it is possible to understand the failure to
protect anonymous speech as an implicitly content-based restriction on speech"); Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 466-67 (2000) (book review) (stating that lack
of privacy causes individuals to be cautious about anything controversial, "thus moving towards
the bleak conformism that Uohn Stuart] Mill saw as the greatest threat to 'personal lib-
ert' ... in a modern democracy").
See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 28
n.111 (1998) ("For many people and groups on the margins of power, the people most in need
of First Amendment support and the people most likely to be excluded from the political proc-
ess, the opportunity to participate anonymously can be crucial."); Stein, supra note 87, at 199-
211 (applying this principle to gay men and lesbians). Of course, an impoverished person
probably cannot afford to donate to a political campaign, but those marginalized for other rea-
sons, such as race, gender, sexual orientation, or ideology, may well have the resources to con-
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In addition to its constitutional significance, the chilling effect
presents a major practical problem. Robust public debate costs
money. A single thirty-second prime-time television commercial on a
New York City network affiliate costs about $30,000."' Congressional
campaigns spent just over $772 million on the 2002 elections."4 This
amount may seem hefty, but it is dwarfed by consumer-products ad-
vertising that seeks to convey much simpler messages than the politi-
cal content of a campaign. Absent either a serious national com-
mitment to public financing or free media access for campaigns, we
will depend on private contributions to fund the political speech that
informs voters.r 6  I noted earlier how few Americans contribute
money to campaigns and how little they give.'1 7 Contribution limits
establish sensible safeguards to avoid corruption, but only at the price
of further reducing the funds available for candidates and causes to
promote their message. As a policy matter, the electoral system can-
not afford to discourage contributors needlessly by stripping them of
their privacy. At the very least this additional cost of disclosure
should be recognized.
Of course, disclosure is intended to deter at least some contribu-
tors, those who are seeking to "corrupt" a candidate and will pre-
sumably be scared off their scheme by public notice."8 As the next
Part will explain, however, this narrow goal is ill-served by disclosure
requirements so broad that they deter every donor-large or small,
tribute. In fact, some persons with quite low incomes do donate. See AES Studies, supra note 34
(indicating that 7 percent of respondents with an income in the seventeenth through thirty-
third percentiles gave political contributions in the 2000 elections, compared to 9 percent over-
all).
113 John Harwood, Control of Congress Lies in a Few Races in Smaller Locales, WALL ST.J., Oct. 14,
2002, at Al.
114 Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, Congressional Campaign Expenditures Total $772
Million at http://www.fec.gov/press/20030103can.exp.html (Jan. 2, 2003).
115 Advertising spending in the United States in 2002 was estimated to be $237 billion. See
David Kaplan & Andrew McMains, A Slow Climb Upward in 2003, ADWEEK, Dec. 16, 2002 (citing
projections by Robert Coen of McCann-Erickson); see also Baker, supra note 112, at 35 (noting
that total expenditures on all federal elections in the 1995-96 cycle, including presidential cam-
paign, were less than that year's marketing budget for Philip Morris); Kathleen Sampey &Jack
Feuer, Deutsch Gets Special Order, ADWEEK, May 6, 2002 (stating that the annual United States
advertising budget for Burger King is $300 million).
116 will put to one side the objection that the dominance of television and other expensive
media in campaigns is normatively undesirable. Critics of this view have rightly questioned it as
misplaced, and perhaps counterproductive, wishful thinking. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1713 & n.41 (1999)
(arguing that curbing political influence gained through campaign contributions will lead to
spending in other, possibly less beneficial, places). The analysis in this Article will assume that
campaigns continue to rely on mass media.
117 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
118 See Baker, supra note 112, at 46 n.165 (noting the paradox of desirable deterrence).
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"corrupt" or not-who is unwilling to display his or her political be-
liefs to the general public.' 9
Overall, concrete penalties, incursions on autonomy and dignity
interests, and the resulting deterrence of expression combine to im-
pose serious privacy costs. When courts and commentators evaluate
contribution disclosure rules, they consistently underestimate these
costs. I will now turn to the other side of the balance and consider
the benefits of disclosure requirements.
II. THE BENEFITS OF DISCLOSURE
Not only does current doctrine understate the importance of pri-
vacy, it also overstates the benefits of disclosure. This Part reassesses
the three government interests held in Buckley v. Valeo to outweigh
privacy costs and justify disclosure: (1) providing information to the
public about a candidate's likely positions on issues; (2) deterring
corruption of a candidate by donors; and (3) enforcing limits on con-
tributions.2  I conclude that all three are less significant than Buckley
held, especially when applied to smaller contributions.
A. Information
Buckley relied heavily on the idea that information about cam-
paign contributions "allows the voters to place each candidate in the
political spectrum more precisely.' 2 This view emphasizes that the
allegiances of individual financial backers can give cues about a can-
didate's likely political positions,just as the announced endorsements
of advocacy groups, labor unions, or other elected officials do. While
19 See infra Part IL.B (critiquing the Buckley analysis of corruption).
120 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam); see Hasen, Complex Case, supra note 27, at 270
(summarizing the three state interests named in Buckley); Potter, supra note 23, at 74 (also
summarizing the Buckley interests). McIntyre accepts the Buckley list implicitly, while distinguish-
ing it in application to the facts there. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 354
(1995).
121 Other cases sometimes state that Buckley recognizes only the corruption interest. See, e.g.,
FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985) (calling corruption and its appear-
ance "the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances"). This proposition may be true of regulations on expenditures, but Buckley
gives weight to all three interests when evaluating contribution disclosure. For more on the
Buckley distinction between expenditures and contributions, see infra Part III.A, especially notes
160-64 and accompanying text.
2 424 U.S. at 67 ("[S]ources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the
interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of
future performance in office."); see BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 224 (2001) ("Knowing the sources of a candidate's campaign funds
provides us with a shorthand method for estimating a candidate's probable stand on a variety of
issues.").
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this argument may occasionally hold true for very large contributions,
it does not make much sense when applied to individual contribu-
tions of a few hundred dollars.
Although it might seem difficult to quarrel with the government's
interest in informing the electorate about candidates' possible stands
on public issues, the McIntyre Court did just that when Ohio offered a
parallel interest to defend its ban on anonymous electioneering.
"The simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant in-
formation," the Court said, "does not justify a state requirement that
a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit.
'' 23
The McIntyre Court acknowledged that the disclosure Ohio required
might be useful to voters, but2)udged this benefit insufficient to over-
come the right to anonymity.
McIntyre took pains to distinguish the leaflet disclosure require-
ment from campaign finance disclosure rules.125 The decisive differ-
ence, according to McIntyre, was the fact that a leaflet revealed more
private information than disclosure of an expenditure (or, presuma-
bly, a contribution):
True, in another portion of the Buckley opinion we expressed approval of
a requirement that even 'independent expenditures' in excess of a
threshold level be reported to the Federal Election Commission. But
that requirement entailed nothing more than an identification to the
Commission of the amount and use of money expended in support of a
candidate .... A written election-related document-particularly a leaf-
let-is often a personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint ....
As such, identification of the author against her will is particularly intru-
sive; it reveals unmistakably the content of [Mrs. McIntyre's] thoughts on
a controversial issue. Disclosure of an expenditure and its use, without
more, reveals far less information.
26
At most, the Court was half right here. The exposure of Mrs. McIn-
tyre's "personally crafted" pamphlet might indeed exact steeper pri-
vacy costs than disclosure of a modest contribution she makes to
Senator Doe's campaign. As Part I documented, the privacy costs of
123 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995); see Potter, supra note 23, at
103-04 (suggesting that McIntyre dismissed and thus undermined informational interest from
Buckley).
124 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348. McIntyre suggested that a voter could instead take the anony-
mous nature of the pamphlet into account when assessing it. 514 U.S. at 348 & n.lI (quoting
New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)) ("'Do not underestimate the
common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writ-
ing .... They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message .... ").
125 514 U.S. at 353-57; see also infta notes 209-14 and accompanying text (discussing other ef-
forts in McIntyre to distinguish elections). The Court also noted that Mrs. McIntyre's expendi-
ture was independent, while contributions to a candidate implicated corruption interests, see
infra Part IIB, which were not present in her case. 514 U.S. at 354.
126 Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
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contribution disclosure can be very high, even if the typical costs of
pamphlet disclosure are still higher.
2 7
But the Court forgot that the distinction cuts both ways. For the
same reason that disclosure required by Ohio's unconstitutional law
was arguably "especially intrusive," it was also especially informative.
If the intrusiveness of contribution disclosure is reduced precisely be-
cause it provides less information, then the information argument in
favor of disclosure must weaken commensurately. The McIntyre
Court's attempt to distinguish the two situations ignored the other
side of the cost-benefit scale.
Contribution disclosure actually provides much less information
than was required by the Ohio law-and McIntyre struck down that
law as insufficiently informative to overcome the right to anonymity.
Elizabeth Garrett recently noted that, in order for the support of a
contributor to provide an informative cue for a voter, at a minimum
the voter must correctly associate the contributor's ideology with the
recipient's, and must be able to learn of the contribution conven-
iently.2 18 If we hypothetically compare mandatory disclosure of Mrs.
McIntyre's name on her pamphlets with the mandatory disclosure of
her contribution to Senator Doe, the Ohio law fulfills these condi-
tions better than does contribution disclosure. Indeed, contribution
disclosure fails both tests.
First of all, disclosure of a contribution only helps a voter who cor-
rectly associates the contributor's identity with some ideological posi-
tion and then correctly connects that position with that of the candi-
date. This is not so simple. To begin with, the information argument
for contribution disclosure assumes that the individual names and
addresses in a list of modest-sized contributions will mean something
to voters.'2 Even if this dubious proposition were true, those voters
17 It is notable that, after its sweeping comments on information privacy and speech in other
arenas, McIntyre retreated to a "reprisal" measure of privacy costs. Id. ("[W] hen money supports
an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely [than a pamphlet] to precipitate retaliation."); see supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the "retaliation" view of privacy costs).
128 Garrett, supra note 3, at 1027. Garrett also points to another condition, that the informa-
tion be credible, rather than sending a strategic false signal. Id.
12 Cf McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-49 ("Moreover, in the case of a handbill written by a private
citizen,... the name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's ability to
evaluate the document's message."). One possible exception is the rare contribution by a per-
son whom an opponent tries to revile as a campaign issue. In the 2000 Senate race, for exam-
ple, Hillary Rodham Clinton was attacked for receiving contributions from several allegedly pro-
Palestinian figures, a potential liability in a state with a large Jewish vote. See Clifford J. Levy &
David M. Halbfinger, Torrent of Campaign Cash Both Helped and Backfired, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2000, at B20. These exceptions are so minor and unusual, however, that they seem to prove the
rule that modest individual donations are rarely newsworthy. Besides, in this case, the accusa-
tions did not have the desired impact with the public, see id., further underscoring the minimal
information interest in spotlighting such individual contributions. Cf Garrett, supra note 3, at
1034-35 (discussing potential cues provided by contributions from "notorious" groups).
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also must know what Mrs. McIntyre believes in order to draw any in-
ference at all about her contribution. It is unlikely that even famous
individual contributors can easily be connected with ideological posi-
tions. 30 If a voter both knows who Mrs. McIntyre is and identifies her
views correctly on issues, her contribution to Senator Doe expresses
her support, but says nothing about the underlying motives for that
support. A voter still can only guess whether Mrs. McIntyre and Sena-
tor Doe actually agree on any particular issue, and whether ideology
really motivated the contribution at all.''
Compare this tenuous chain of inferences to the information pro-
vided by the Ohio pamphleteering law. Mrs. McIntyre exercised ab-
solute control over the content and tone of her pamphlet; a reader
who knows her identity can safely assume that the ideas in the pam-
phlet are hers and evaluate them accordingly. Loosely equating the
information provided by her contribution and by a Sierra Club con-
tribution simply glides past the fact that voters know what the Sierra
Club believes, and so glean a fairly accurate cue from its support of a
candidate .3
The disclosure required by Ohio law in McIntyre also informed
voters more effectively than campaign contribution disclosure be-
cause it was targeted to exactly the relevant audience. Ohio could ar-
gue that every reader of Mrs. McIntyre's pamphlet would find infor-
mation about its source useful, and that Ohio structured its law to
ensure that this information would reach every voter who was poten-
tially influenced by her arguments, but almost no one else. In con-
trast, even the atypical voter--one who might find it useful to know,
when assessing Senator Doe's candidacy, that Mrs. McIntyre gave a
contribution-can learn that information only by taking the initiative
to seek it out. Meanwhile, this personal information is equally avail-
able to a contributor's employers and neighbors. In other words,
campaign contribution disclosure, unlike disclosure under the Ohio
law, is not made directly and solely to those voters who might find it
useful.
A pattern of individual contributors with particular interests might
be somewhat informative, but discerning such a pattern amidst the
vast quantities of disclosed information requires a great deal of ef-
130 See Garrett, supra note 3, at 1043 ("For example, what information is conveyed by substan-
tial financial support from Bill Gates?").
131 Id. (stating that mixed motives for individuals' contributions make them less informative
than groups' contributions). As noted earlier, Mrs. McIntyre's support may have nothing to do
with Senator Doe's views. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
132 See SMITH, supra note 122, at 224 (suggesting that contributions by ideologically-affiliated
groups, like their endorsements, serve as proxies for voters assessing a candidate). While Smith
refers to contributions by groups when he states the premise, he extends the argument to those
made by individuals.
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fort. 3 3 Even if an enterprising journalist could show that an array of
persons known to support issue X had contributed to Senator Doe, it
would at best provide weak evidence of Doe's position on the issue,
compared to Doe's own statements, past voting record, or endorse-
ments from newspapers, other officials, or interest groups who state
their clear preferences on issue X.13 4 And the disclosure needed to
squeeze this small information out of contributions imposes privacy
costs on all donors, including those who have nothing to do with such
marginally informative patterns.
It is particularly difficult to imagine anything very remarkable
emerging from disclosure of smaller individual contributions. The
donors' reasons for contributing are so varied and their influence on
the candidate so minimal that identification of any meaningful pat-
tern becomes troublesome. Thus, even those who support disclosure
of political spending by groups must acknowledge that the case for it
is weak where individual contributions are concerned.
3
5
This is not to deny that some voters in some circumstances might
gather some useful information from contribution disclosure. It is
arguably more likely in the choice between candidates, who present
complex bundles of issue preferences, personal attributes, and "char-
acter," compared to the straightforward up-or-down question in a ref-
erendum (such as the one at issue in McIntyre). Decisions about can-
didates are based on predictions about their likely positions on future
issues, and the identity of their contributors may provide evidence for
that evaluation. But a voter can get better evidence by examining
133 See DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN
FINANCING IN AMERICA 103-12 (1975) (arguing that the "tidal wave" of disclosed campaign fi-
nance information overwhelms both journalists and voters); Garrett, supra note 3, at 1025
("[T]oo much information can overwhelm the ability of average Americans to process and un-
derstand information and may result in their tuning out data that could provide helpful cues.").
There are, of course, journalists and nonprofit organizations that undertake this project. See
supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. As I shall suggest later, if these types of patterns are
really the goal, then perhaps we should design disclosure systems that concentrate on aggregate
data while sacrificing less information privacy. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
134 If the pattern went against Senator Doe's public positions or other evidence of his views,
the most likely explanation would be that the contributors gave his campaign modest sums of
money for some other reason. Cf supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. It is just possible,
if Doe had taken no position (or a vague or unclear position) on issue X, that a pattern of fi-
nancial support from those with clear positions on issue X might allow a plausible inference
about his likely position. Given the amount of labor required to assemble the facts and the ex-
treme weakness of this inference, it does not amount to a very compelling government interest.
It certainly does not compare with the value of the information that a reader of Mrs. McIntyre's
pamphlets receives.
135 See Briffault, supra note 27, at 1790 (considering it unlikely, in the context of issue advo-
cacy, that "voter decision-making would be enhanced if the sources of a few hundred dollars
[were] required to be disclosed"); Garrett, supra note 3, at 1043-44 (acknowledging that the
disclosure of individual contributions, unlike the disclosure of group contributions, is unlikely
to provide much useful information to voters).
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other readily available sources of information rather than by guessing
the policy motivation of small contributors.
Because it went no deeper than a simple assertion about the value
of ideological cues from contributors, Buckley overstated the value of
this information. The Court was closer to the truth in McIntyre, when
it recognized that the information interest in identity disclosure,
while real, was small.3 6 When McIntyre weighed this information in-
terest against the true privacy costs of disclosure, it began to look
even smaller.
B. Corruption
By exposing campaign contributions to public scrutiny, Buckley
states, the government advances its efforts to "deter actual corruption
and avoid the appearance of corruption.' '137 This is different from the
information rationale, which posits that contributions enable predic-
tions about candidates' stands on the issues. However, it has prob-
lems similar to the information rationale that make it weaker than
commonly assumed.
In standard campaign finance jurisprudence, preventing corrup-
tion is the most favored justification for regulation, but "corruption"
usually takes on the specific meaning of a direct trade between can-
didate and contributor-a "quid pro quo: dollars for political fa-
vors." 38 A broader and less precise formulation of the corruption in-
terest extends from worries about "quid pro quo" swaps to a more
general concern that elected officials will be too beholden to con-
tributors, and to a belief that candidates are sullied by certain types of
campaign financing. 39 Perhaps a better label for this broader under-
standing of corruption is "excessive influence."
However broadly the evil is defined, many see disclosure as the
cure for it. They assume that properly informed voters will punish a
13 Cf Briffault, supra note 27, at 1773 n.124 ("Still, it is fair to say that McIntyre placed far
greater weight on the anti-corruption function of disclosure and less on its informational value
than did Buckley."); Potter, supra note 23, at 106 ("[T]he overall trend in disclosure cases has
been skepticism toward the pro-disclosure framework enunciated in Buckley.").
137 424 U.S. at 67.
138 FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985); see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978) (using a quid pro quo understanding of corruption); Buck-
ley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (using the same view of corruption).
139 The Supreme Court has applied this more expansive view to an analysis of limits on the
size of contributions. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389-90 (2000) (recog-
nizing a state interest in stopping corruption "extending to the broader threat from politicians
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors"). The Court most recently discussed the
corruption rationale in FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003), where the majority opinion
seemed to revivify a moribund interpretation of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990), as including the use of the corporate form to amass "war chests" for political spend-
ing as a form of corruption. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
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candidate who collects what they see as "dirty" money. This ration-
ale for disclosure displays two major flaws when examined in light of
current law and technology.
14'
First, the corruption interest, like the information interest, fails to
justify disclosure of modest-sized contributions. Most donors are
small fry.' 42 Their negligible influence poses little danger of corrup-
tion, however defined. As one of the lawyers for the Buckley plaintiffs
wrote a few years before the decision, "it is flatly unbelievable that a
contribution of [$100] could have an undesirable impact." 43 Buckley
itself acknowledged that many small contributions "are too low even
to attract the attention of the candidate, much less have a corrupting
influence."' 44 Rather than serving as one side of a corrupt trade or in-
fluencing the candidate excessively, the typical small contribution
earns only a thank-you card and subsequent appeals for more money.
Second, even when somewhat larger sums are contributed, very
few voters actually give much consideration to the nature of candi-
dates' donors when choosing whether to support them. The utility
of disclosure as a technique to deter corruption collapses if its sup-
posed enforcers, an outraged public, do not play their assigned
role. 146
There are several commonsense reasons that disclosed contribu-
tions sway so few voters. The most obvious one resembles the prob-
lems just discussed in connection with the information interest. Raw
data about contributors, while very easy to obtain, is difficult to digest
140 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 222 (1999) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[F]inancial disclosure requirements tend to dis-
courage those who are subject to them from engaging in improper conduct.... ."); SABATO &
SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 333-34 (arguing that improved disclosure would expose special-
interest "favor-seekers" whose contributions will be seen as "dirty" in "the court of public opin-
ion").
141 McIntyre found this justification inapplicable to the situation before it, because it was a
referendum campaign rather than a candidate campaign. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995); see Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298
(1981) (differentiating between candidate campaigns and ballot initiatives); Hasen, Complex
Case, supra note 27, at 273 (discussing this aspect of McIntyre).
42 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing how few persons contribute, and
that most contribute relatively small amounts).
143 RALPH K. WINTER, JR., CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 21 (1973). Under
the original FECA amendments then being debated, contributions above $100 were disclosed;
the threshold is now $200. See supra note 43.
144 424 U.S. at 82-84; see Garrett, supra note 3, at 1015-16 ("Indeed, sums substantially higher
than $200 probably do not buy political favors.... ."); Bernstein, supra note 64 ("A corruption-
watcher worried about such small amounts would be missing the forest for the twigs.").
145 See ACKERMAN &AYRES, supra note 3, at 27 & 250 nn.2-3 ("Researchers have yet to find an
election between candidates in which information about funding actually made a difference in
the outcome.").
146 See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 30, at 844 ("[Tloday's jaded citizenry imposes hardly any
electoral punishment on candidates known to have sold political access.").
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and interpret. The implications of any single allegedly "dirty" contri-
bution can be understood only in the context of a candidate's entire
campaign finance profile. "Excessive" influence is also in the eye of
the beholder. Different candidates may be equally indebted to their
donors, so that voters will often find it difficult to distinguish between
candidates on this basis.
1 47
More fundamentally, conscientious voters trying to decide which
candidate to support must balance corruption concerns against fac-
tors which will often be more important to them. As David Adamany
and George Agree summarized this problem a quarter century ago:
The theory of disclosure insists that voters will reject candidates at the
polls when disclosure shows too much spending, misdirected spending,
unsavory or disfavored financial sources, or excessive contributions. In
elections, however, a citizen cannot express himself [or herself] solely on
campaign finance practices; his [or her] vote for a candidate is a decision
about many other issues as well .... [V]oters do not and should not give
campaign finance practices heavy weight in making ballot choices, and
therefore candidates rarely need fear that disclosure of such practices will
result in political penalties at the polls.1
4
1
This is not necessarily regrettable public apathy. Rather, it may rep-
resent rational prioritization by the electorate. If a voter favors one
candidate's substantive issue positions, discomfort with his or her
campaign finance practices alone may not (and perhaps should not)
alter that preference. 9  Once again, disclosure makes sense only if we
assume that sunlight leads voters to respond in some fashion we
147 See ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 133, at 114 ("In the present political financing system,
both parties and virtually all candidates receive and use funds from big givers and interest
groups. Voters usually do not have a choice between clean money candidates and dirty money
candidates; all are soiled.").
148
Id. at 112, 114 (arguing that disclosing campaign finance information does not affect vot-
ing decisions because, among other things, voters choose "leaders ... whose general outlook
coincides with their own ... [and] selectively perceive facts that confirm their choices").
149 See id. at 113-114. Ackerman and Ayres note that the public has been found to pay more
attention to campaign financing in referendum campaigns-exactly those situations in which
votes turn on only one issue, rather than complex bundles of policy preferences, leaving more
room for consideration of funding. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 27 & 250 n.2 (citing
ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE
OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999)); but see Garrett, supra note 3, at 1034 & n. 86 (questioning this
contention by Ackerman and Ayres). The election of Senator Jon S. Corzine in New Jersey
might further illustrate voters' disinterest in a candidate's means of financing the campaign.
Corzine spent a record $60 million on the race, drawn largely from his personal wealth, and
gave charitable contributions to groups whose leaders then endorsed him. See David M.
Halbfinger, Corzine Wins Costly Bid for Senate in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at Al. While
his opponent attempted to draw attention to these practices and criticize them, much of the
campaign focused on topics such as gun control and health care, and Corzine's positions on
these issues resonated far more with New Jersey's increasingly Democratic voters. See id.;
Marjorie Connelly, Vote in U.S. Senate Race Followed 12-Year Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, § 1,
at 44.
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deem appropriate. But there are several subsidiary assumptions em-
bedded in this one: voters must be able to learn something useful,
and they must choose to act on it.
C. Enforcement
The third interest Buckley found in disclosure, "gathering the data
necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations,' '  can
be dispensed with completely. First, the Court has rejected disclosure
requirements aimed at preventing related illegal activity, such as libel
or deception, because of their overbroad application."' Even if they
could be tailored more narrowly, the notion that a campaign would
break the rules but then dutifully report the infraction is "silly.'
' 2
Most significandy, enforcement may require reporting, but not
true public disclosure. Although the two are often conflated, 5 3 it is
important to distinguish between them. Disclosure can be defined as
the government's release of information about political contributions
to the general public. It is conceptually separate from reporting,
when the law requires donors or recipients to tell the government
about contributions so that the government-without necessarily re-
leasing the information-can monitor compliance with the law) 54 We
could require reporting of campaign contributions but not disclo-
sure.15  Other personal information is reported to the government,
150 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam).
15! See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343-44 (1995) (rejecting the argu-
ment that disclosure is "a means to prevent the dissemination of untruths" because "the ordi-
nance plainly applies even when there is no hint of falsity or libel"); Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (rejecting the justification of leaflet disclosure law as a means to enforce
fraud, false advertising, and libel laws because of overbreadth in application).
152 DAVID ADAMANY, FINANCING POLITICS: RECENT WISCONSIN ELECTIONS 250 (1969) ("As a
practical matter, the only enforcement benefit that disclosure laws have is the occasional report-
ing of a minor infraction which occurs because the law's provisions are obscure.").
153 The FEC itself fell into this trap when extolling the virtues of disclosure: "In fact, it would
be virtually impossible for the Commission to effectively fulfill any of its other responsibilities
without disclosure. The Commission could not, for example, enforce the law without knowl-
edge of each committee's receipts and disbursements." TE-C Twenty-Year Report, supra note 55, at
294. One pair of experts recognized the distinction between reporting and disclosure, but used
the term "reporting" as an umbrella to refer to both candidates' "filing" data with the govern-
ment and the government's "disclosure" of that data to the public. See HOLMAN & STERN, supra
note 48, at 2; see also Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 2000) (rec-
ognizing a distinction in state issue advocacy disclosure law).
154 See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 198 (1999) (holding that the
government interest in apprehending "petition circulators who engage in misconduct" can be
fulfilled just as well by collecting information about circulators with petitions-reporting-
rather than mandating that petition circulators wear identification badges-disclosure).
155 Federal campaign finance law requires campaigns to keep records about all contributors
who give over $50, even though only those over $200 need to be reported to the FEC. See 2
U.S.C. § 432(c) (2003).
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but not disclosed to the public, in income tax returns 56 and census
forms.157 Citing the government's interest in enforcement adds no
weight to the pro-disclosure side of the scale.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
So, a reevaluation finds that disclosure imposes more privacy costs
than widely acknowledged, and that the troika of government inter-
ests is less substantial than Buckley suggested. This result casts serious
doubt on the advisability of our current disclosure regime and espe-
cially its application to modest contributions. I will return to this
doubt in Part IV. This Part considers what the new assessment of
costs and benefits might mean for a renewed constitutional chal-
lenge, based on the privacy costs that disclosure requirements impose
on individuals and the resulting chilling effect on contributors' po-
litical activity.
By necessity, much of this consideration is somewhat speculative.
For one thing, the Supreme Court's impending decision in McConnell
v. FEC, the challenge to the McCain-Feingold Act, makes this the
most uncertain moment for campaign finance jurisprudence since
Buckley."5 Furthermore, courts have not focused on the unique prob-
lems of privacy and contribution disclosure-indeed they have
strained to avoid the question . 1 9 Finally, the most significant factor
making the analysis tentative is the lack of clarity about what type and
degree of protection the First Amendment provides to political con-
tributions.
As a result of these limitations, I do not reach a clear answer to the
question of how contribution disclosure laws might fare against a
constitutional challenge. Yet even that result is a step forward. As we
have seen, most observers today think the answer is clear, and fail to
recognize the problem of privacy costs. They thus ignore a credible
argument that mandatory disclosure of contributions, especially those
of modest size, violates the First Amendment.
156 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2003) (establishing the general rule that disclosure of information
from tax returns is prohibited, with specified exceptions, including recent changes related to
investigating terrorist activity).
157 See 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2003) (establishing broad confidentiality rules for census information);
13 U.S.C. § 214 (2003) (making unlawful disclosure of census information a criminal offense
punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both).
15 The symposium on McConnell appearing in this issue, 6 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 56 (2003), can-
vasses many views concerning the significance and outcome of McConnell. As contribution dis-
closure is one of the only major issues that is not raised in that case, I will simply consider the
question here on the basis of the Buckley framework and two nascent schools of thought con-
cerning post-Buckley law.
159 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's avoidance of
contribution anonymity issues in McIntyre and Watchtower).
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This Part should at least demonstrate that we cannot assume the
constitutionality of contribution disclosure as automatically and rou-
tinely as we do--or, indeed, as automatically as the Buckley per curiam
opinion assumed it. It first analyzes the question through the lens of
the current Buckley doctrine, although that lens is clouded at best. It
then comments on whether an answer might be different under ei-
ther of the two emerging interpretations that are now competing to
supplant the Buckley framework.
A. The Buckley Standard for Scrutinizing Disclosure
The black letter summary of "the central conceptual edifice inher-
ited from Buckley" is easy to state: "By contrast to the permissive arena
of regulation for contributions, the Court has extended, as a general
matter, broad constitutional protection to all expenditures by candi-
dates for office."' 60 Expenditures are those amounts spent directly on
communication about politics by campaigns, outside groups, or indi-
viduals. Contributions are funds that are instead given to campaigns
or groups, who in turn pool the contributions in order to make ex-
penditures. The Buckley framework has many critics. 16' But it was re-
affirmed just a few months ago in FEC v. Beaumont, where the Court
explicitly relied on the distinction between contributions and expen-
ditures. 2 This edifice may remain standing for some time to come.
Excessive focus on the distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures, however, may conceal the fact that both receive constitu-
tional protection; Buckley emphatically noted that "both implicate
fundamental First Amendment interests.' 63 The difference is one of
degree rather than kind. While perhaps less central than direct ex-
9 '64penditures, contributions are also a form of political expression.'
The exact level of constitutional protection for contributions
proves more difficult to articulate than the simple rule that they are
different from expenditures. This ambiguity impedes any effort to
assess the constitutionality of contribution disclosure requirements.
As one recent Supreme Court opinion noted, perhaps with a hint of
dry humor, "Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to re-
view contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam
10 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 460 (2d ed. 2001).
MA See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
162 FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2207-2211 (2003).
163 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam).
HA Id. at 14 (calling political campaign activities, including contributions, "the most funda-
mental First Amendment activities"); BeVier, supra note 27, at 288-92 (emphasizing this aspect
of Buckley).
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opinion."' 65 The standard used in many cases involving direct expen-
ditures is "exacting scrutiny"-really almost a form of strict scrutiny-
which would require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to meet
asserted state interests. 166  As a starting point, then, contributions
might be thought to receive something less than this degree of scru-
tiny but more than nothing.1
67
How much more? Two recent majority opinions written by Justice
Souter provide some limited guidance. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, the Supreme Court applied quite minimal scrutiny
to a state law limiting the maximum amount of campaign contribu-
tions." The Eighth Circuit had used strict scrutiny.6 9  The Shrink
Missouri Court explicitly rejected this standard and instead deferred
to the state legislature in upholding contribution caps much smaller
than those in federal law."7 In Beaumont, the Supreme Court rejected
a challenge to the federal ban on direct corporate contributions.'7'
The case was brought by an "advocacy" corporation, North Carolina
Right to Life, Inc., which hoped the Court would extend an earlier
decision striking down restrictions on expenditures by similar
groups. The Beaumont Court refused, pointing to the difference be-
tween exacting scrutiny of restrictions on expenditures and the "rela-
tively complaisant review" of contribution restrictions.73 "[I] nstead of
requiring contribution regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest, a contribution limit involving sig-
nificant interference with associational rights passes muster if it satis-
fies the lesser demand of being closely drawn to match a sufficiently
important interest.
"
1
16 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
166 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
167 See Lincoln Club v. City of Irvine, 292 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is clear that ex-
penditure limitations are subject to strict scrutiny and contribution limits are subject to less
than strict scrutiny .... ").
168 528 U.S. at 391-97 (requiring little empirical evidence to justify contribution limits and
concluding that limits would be held too low only if "so radical in effect as to render political
association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and ren-
der contributions pointless"); see Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and "The
Thing That Wouldn't Leave, "17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 490-91 (2000) (evaluating the low level of
scrutiny applied in Shrink Missouri).
169 528 U.S. at 384.
170 See id. at 386-89, 393. Missouri law limited individual contributions to candidates for
statewide office, including governor, to $1,075; the cap for state legislative campaigns was $275.
Id. at 382-83.
171 FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003). The ban on corporate contributions is found in
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2003).
172 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
175 123 S. Ct. at 2210.
174 Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
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Before Beaumont, it seemed that the very deferential standard of
Shrink Missouri might apply only to review of contribution limits, and
not necessarily to other regulations of contributions, such as disclo-
sure. After all, the rationale for extending less First Amendment pro-
tection to contributions than to expenditures in the first place was
the holding in Buckley that a donor's speech interest is tied up in the
act of making a donation rather than in its amount.7 5 In other words,
when determining the First Amendment content of contributions,
size doesn't matter. Shrink Missouri echoed this reasoning.'76 Its re-
sult followed almost automatically, because contribution caps affect
the size of a contribution alone.
Buckley declared that the expressive portion of a contribution, on
the other hand, is "the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contribut-
ing. 1 7 7 Perhaps the conceptual divide of Buckley, while described in
convenient shorthand as a split between contributions and expendi-
tures, should be expressed more precisely as a distinction between
the size of contributions on one hand, and other forms of spending
aimed at political expression (including the "fact" of contributions)
on the other hand. Disclosure of a contribution's existence reveals
that precise part of it that Buckley identified as highly protected
speech and association. The impingement is on the act of contrib-
uting, not the amount contributed. On Buckley's terms, then, this
form of political expression should enjoy significantly more protec-
tion than the nearly toothless Shrink Missouri scrutiny provides for
donation size.
Beaumont could be read to call this analysis into question. Even
though the restriction at issue there was an outright ban, not a size
limit, the Court rejected an argument by opponents of the ban that
exacting scrutiny should therefore apply."79 On the other hand, the
reasoning in Beaumont depended heavily on several considerations
that would be absent from a case concerning contribution disclosure.
175 Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21, 30 (1976) (per curiam) ("The quantity of communica-
tion by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the
expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing .... Such distinc-
tions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in
kind.").
176 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000). While the concurrence
adopts a broader rationale, see id. at 400-02 (Breyer, J., concurring), it does not represent bind-
ing precedent (at least not yet) and its viewpoint is therefore deferred until Part III.B.2.
177 424 U.S. at 21.
178 While Buckley glides over the distinction between the speech and associational interests
inherent in political contributions, 424 U.S. at 24-25, the two recent cases appear to give priority
to the associational interest. See Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. at 2210; Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at
388. The difference is immaterial to the analysis here, and I will sometimes refer simply to
"speech" interests.
17,) 123 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
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First, it emphasized at length that the restrictions were aimed at cor-
porations, which enjoy unique state-conferred advantages, 8' and that
previous decisions had repeatedly upheld limits on contributions by
corporations.' Second, the opinion recognized throughout that
laws restricting corporate political activity function "without jeopard-
izing the associational rights of advocacy organizations' members."82
Indeed, these restrictions may promote the associational rights of in-
dividuals by preventing corporations from contributing to causes that
some of their individual stockholders might not support. 8  Third,
the holding turned on the fact that a corporation has another obvi-
ous and often-used option to make federal political contributions: it
can form a PAC.18 4 As a result of this different avenue for contribut-
ing, the prohibition on direct corporate contributions did not func-
tion like a ban at all.8 5 As we have seen, however, many individuals
concerned about privacy lack clear alternative avenues for political
expression and association.
Moreover, the Beaumont Court recognized that a ban and a limit
present different constitutional issues. It commented, somewhat del-
phicly, "It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be
ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny
at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.
This riddle seems to say that contribution regulations always receive
less than strict scrutiny, but that the resemblance of a particular re-
striction to a ban would influence the crucial determination of
whether it was "closely drawn" to serve government interests.
.-This articulation would provide more robust protection than the
extreme deference of Shrink Missouri. It is also consistent with the
180 Id. at 2205-07.
18a Id. at 2205-09; see Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC 470 U.S. 480, 495, 500-01 (1985); FEC v. Nat'l Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-11 (1982); see generally Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election
Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243 (1999) (discussing the regulation of corporate involvement in
elections).
182 123 S. Ct. at 2211 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)); see id. at 2210 n.8
(recognizing that "corporate contributions are furthest from the core of political expression");
supra note 23 and accompanying text (distinguishing disclosure of group contributions from
disclosure of individual contributions).
183 123 S. Ct. at 2206-07.
184 Id. at 2211 (citing Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 201-02).
185 The opinion concluded, "[Respondents] cannot prevail, then, simply by arguing that a
ban on an advocacy corporation's direct contributions is bad tailoring. [Respondents] would
have to demonstrate that the law violated the First Amendment in allowing contributions to be
made only through its PAC and subject to a PAC's administrative burdens." Id. at 2211. Beau-
mont found that position flatly inconsistent with the unanimous holding in National Right to Work
that administrative restrictions on PACs were constitutional. Id. (citing Nat'l Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. at 201-02).
186 Id.
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suggestion in Shrink Missouri that a contribution cap could eventually
be unconstitutional if it were so stringent that it eradicated the entire
worth of the contribution-that is, if it impinged on the "fact" of a
contribution rather than solely its size. 8 7 Finally, it acknowledges that
Buckley generated the distinction between contributions and expendi-
tures in the context of reviewing FECA's limits on the permissible
dollar amounts of each, but that the concept may not function prop-
erly when moved to a different setting such as disclosure.
Disclosure requirements with thresholds (such as the $200 cutoff
in federal law or the lower ones in many states) may seem closer to
limits, since they apply only to contributions of a certain size. For two
reasons, they should be analyzed more like a ban when applying the
Beaumont test. First, for contributions above the threshold, the result
of disclosure is the announcement to the general public of a personal
"symbolic" political act. This strikes close to the original purpose of
the Buckley distinction, to protect politically expressive content. The
disclosure of Mrs. McIntyre's contribution affects her ability to en-
gage in that political expression, not only the degree to which she
does it. More significantly, contribution limits apply equally to all;
every contributor may give up to a certain amount, and none may
give any more. Size is a neutral and universal trigger. In contrast, we
have seen that privacy costs are distributed unevenly: only some peo-
ple care about the privacy of their contributions, and only some face
penalizing consequences from disclosure. Even worse, disclosure is
more likely to deter contributions aligned with certain ideological
positions-more controversial ones-a correlation that threatens
both the First Amendment protection of contributions and the open
debate we strive for in elections.'8 Those with mainstream views who
choose to sacrifice privacy may contribute an amount above the
threshold while others, whose views are more likely to be unortho-
dox, are chilled from doing so.
It is also questionable whether disclosure is a remedy "closely
drawn" to the asserted government interests discussed in Part II. To
observers accustomed to a salutary view of disclosure, it may seem in-
tuitive that a cap impinges on a donor's rights far more than "mere"
disclosure.' 9 But this conclusion is at odds with the core holding that
a contributor's real First Amendment interest is the undifferentiated
87 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that "contribution restrictions could have a severe im-
pact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.").
188 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing the unevenness of the chilling
effect of campaign contribution disclosure).
189 Recall that the litigants in Buckley stipulated that disclosure was a less restrictive response
than their real concern, contribution caps. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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ability to participate through a political contribution, rather than its
size. Under the logic of Buckley, a more closely drawn restriction,
which infringes on expression and association the least, is a contribu-
tion limit (which impinges on size alone), not disclosure (which im-
pinges on the core of the contributor's First Amendment right).19°
This is especially true in light of the judiciary's openness to the first
change under Shrink Missouri. Furthermore, a limit aims directly at
large contributions, the real cause for corruption concern, while dis-
closure sweeps much more expansively, imposing privacy costs on
contributions that, we have seen, present minimal corruption risk. 9'
The McCain-Feingold Act moved in the opposite direction. The
Act doubles the contribution limit to $2000 and indexes it to inflation
so that it will continue to rise. 192 Meanwhile, the unaltered disclosure
rules apply to all contributors who give over $200, an order of magni-
tude less than the contribution limit.9 3 A system that broadcasts into
cyberspace every contribution between $200 and $2000 exposes the
"fact" of many contributions without targeting the remedy carefully to
those that are related to the asserted problem.
Of course, differential treatment of contributions and expendi-
tures means that disclosure need not be the most closely drawn alter-
native-such a requirement would be closer to the exacting scrutiny
applied to expenditures. Whether they are closely drawn enough
would depend on the gaze of the beholder. But federal rules after
the McCain-Feingold Act, and state rules with even lower thresholds,
do raise troublesome issues. They are especially troublesome in rela-
tioin to modest contributions of a few hundred dollars. An honest
and thorough constitutional evaluation of those laws would require
careful consideration of the privacy costs discussed in Part I and the
weakness in the government justifications outlined in Part II. And
the result of that analysis might well be a conclusion that such sweep-
ing contribution disclosure cannot pass muster under Buckley and its
progeny, including Beaumont.
190 Bradley Smith, who fervently opposes contribution limits but supports disclosure laws,
accepts Buckley's assumption, so he too gets this point backwards. See Smith, supra note 5, at 61-
62 (asserting that Buckley wrongly upheld contribution limits by "departing from the require-
ment that the legislature choose the more narrowly tailored solution-in this case disclosure").
191 SeeAFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding a blanket disclosure rule
requiring broad disclosure of politically-sensitive information to be constitutionally suspect).
192 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307(a) (1), 116 Stat.
81, 102 (raising the individual contribution limit to $2000).
193 Reports by Political Committees, 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a) (4) (i) (2003). Indeed, as noted ear-
lier, the McCain-Feingold Act further expands disclosure. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
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B. Disclosure in a Post-Buckley World
Buckley is perhaps the most extensively criticized opinion of the
Burger Court.194 The awkward distinction between contributions and
expenditures is one of the principal objections to its doctrine.'9 5
Others Rrotest that the framework erroneously equates money and
speech. Antipathy to Buckley is also found within the Supreme
Court itself, where a majority of the Justices appears willing to dis-
mantle the framework dividing contributions and expenditures, but
unable to agree on a replacement.'9 The dissatisfied Justices can be
divided into two camps, although this rough grouping overlooks
more subtle differences between them, and it involves interpretation
of their sometimes cryptic comments. On one side, libertarians such
as Justices Thomas and Scalia and possibly Justice Kennedy would in-
194 See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Introduction to IF BUCKLEYFELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT
FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 1, 1 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999) (quoting and citing
numerous articles in law reviews and newspapers lambasting Buckley) [hereinafter IF BUCKLEY
FELL]. Scorn for Buckley is widespread in legal academia. See Baker, supra note 112, at 1 n.3
(citing efforts by Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and John Rawls to have Buckley over-
turned); Ronald Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra at
63, 65 ("Many constitutional scholars (though by no means all) believe that the Buckley rul-
ing... was a mistake .... ."). One group of scholars and experts has even called for lawyers to
form a "Buckley Brigade" that would pursue a coordinated litigation strategy aimed at overturn-
ing the decision. See E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND WORKING GROUP ON
CAMPAIGN FIN. LITIG., BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 89-106 (1998) [hereinafter BUCKLEY STOPS].
195 See Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 116, at 1736 ("A generation has shown us that the ex-
penditure/contribution distinction of Buckley not only is conceptually flawed, but has not
worked.") (collecting cases); see also BUCKLEY STOPS, supra note 194, at 43-45 (noting that the
distinction is "[t]he single most criticized aspect of Buckley"); Hasen, supra note 168, at 483-84
(comparing Buckley, and especially its distinction between contributions and expenditures, to
the boorish party guest overstaying his welcome, who was portrayed by John Belushi on Saturday
Night Live as "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave").
196 For prominent examples of the widespread critique, see, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I make one simple point. Money is
property; it is not speech."); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 508-09 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend .... ");
J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982) (dubbing the Buckley decision "tragically misguided");J.
Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE LJ. 1001 (1976) (examining
the Buckley decision). Justice Breyer has noted that this "purely conceptual" argument about
money and speech misses the central question: when does regulation of money effectively stifle
speech? See Breyer, supra note 66, at 252.
197 ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 160, at 485-86 ("Both of the anti-Buckley wings are united
by rejecting the core insight of Buckley that different first amendment regimes govern the con-
tributions and expenditures side [s] of electoral regulation. But they are divided by an inability
to agree on the direction in which the Buckley edifice should fall."). For interesting speculation
about where the individual members of the Supreme Court stand on the future of Buckley, see
Hasen, supra note 168, at 505-09. This Article does not take any position on the choice between
the two alternatives; I am only analyzing the implications of each for privacy and contribution
disclosure.
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crease constitutional scrutiny over regulation of contributions. '
Others, including Justices Breyer and Ginsburg and possibly Justice
Stevens, would instead relax constitutional restrictions on campaign
finance law across the board. ' 9 It remains to be seen if one side or
the other might assert itself in McConnell.
2 °
Both groups seem to view contribution disclosure rules of the type
now in place as constitutional and desirable. While analyzing consti-
tutional law "if Buckley fell" 2°' involves even more speculation than the
previous Section, this Section anticipates how each group might re-
spond to my concerns about privacy costs. I conclude that it would
be a mistake to see the problem of privacy costs as a feature unique to
the widely reviled doctrinal approach of Buckley. Rather, the predict-
able tension between privacy and disclosure persists no matter how
the larger doctrinal framework looks.
1. A Libertarian Framework
One camp, exemplified by Justice Thomas, would like to shift
post-Buckley law toward stricter constitutional limits on regulation of
campaign contributions. This move would eliminate the contribu-
tion-expenditure dichotomy by placing both under strict (or perhaps
202exacting") scrutiny.
The usual version of this libertarian model would eliminate con-
tribution limits and rely on full disclosure of contributions. 23 Its pro-
ponents see this structure as analogous to a free market, where dis-
closure gives market actors the information they need to make
198 Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I would overrule Buck-
ley and then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if, based upon their
own considered view of the First Amendment, it is possible to do so."); id. at 410 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[O]ur decision in Buckley was in error, and I would overrule it."); see also FEC v.
Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2212 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reiterating his belief that con-
tributions should receive strict scrutiny, in an opinion joined byJustice Scalia).
199 See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 404-05 (Breyer,J., concurring) (stating, in an opinion
joined by Justice Ginsburg, the potential need to "reconsider" Buckley); Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 648-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing, con-
trary to Buckley, that limits on direct campaign spending, at least by political parties, should be
constitutional).
200 The reliance on the Buckley framework in Beaumont suggests perhaps not. See 123 S. Ct. at
2210-2211; see supra notes 179-86.
201 See generally IF BucKLEY FELL, supra note 194 (presenting essays by scholars considering
replacements for the Buckley framework).
202 See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203 See SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 328-35 (arguing for deregulation of campaign fi-
nancing); SMITH, supra note 122, at 215-20 (arguing against campaign finance regulation as it
currently stands); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV.
311, 326-27 (arguing for full disclosure); see also DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 96-
97 (dubbing such proposals "deregulate and disclose" and calling them "inadequate foundation
for reform").
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decisions. By requiring disclosure, the government ensures that vot-
ers (buyers in the political marketplace) have accurate information
about the campaign finances of candidates (the prices and ingredi-
ents of the products they buy in the political marketplace). As one
Republican congressional leader described it from the floor of the
House of Representatives, the libertarian model would "let the voters
decide through instant disclosure," allowing them to assess candi-
dates "while [the candidates] are collecting their money and spend-
ing it ....
Unfortunately for its adherents, their plan contains a serious in-
consistency. Applying strict scrutiny to everything means that disclo-
sure, too, faces a tough constitutional test. The framework dispenses
with the Buckley distinction between the fact of a contribution and its
size, but only does so by bringing both up to a high level of constitu-
tional protection. The resulting balance leads to greater concern
about privacy costs than under Buckley. Extensive disclosure of mod-
est donations would not survive the strict scrutiny these libertarians
envision.205
The story does not quite end there, however, because the unlim-
ited contributions that would be allowed under the libertarian
framework add a wrinkle. If contribution limits were unconstitu-
tional, a wealthy donor could write a million-dollar check to a candi-
date. Disclosure would fare better in the case of very large contribu-
tions, because the corruption and information interests would
become much stronger.20 6 The potential for donors to extract a quid
pro quo is obviously greater if they have poured huge quantities of
money into a campaign's coffers, intensifying the corruption interest.
A short list of very big donors, compared to a long list of small do-
nors, provides information that is both more digestible and more
relevant for voters. Furthermore, because this framework is designed
to make contribution caps much more difficult to impose, there
would be no obvious and less intrusive alternative to disclosure.
In sum, while the strict scrutiny invoked by a libertarian frame-
work adds to the privacy side of the scale, government interests are
also weightier when huge contributions are allowed. In such cases,
these state interests would eventually overcome even the strictest
scrutiny. This opening for disclosure is limited, however, to large
contributions that magnify the corruption and information interests.
204 The quotation is from Rep. Tom DeLay, then the House majority whip and now the ma-
jority leader. Exceipts from House Debate on the Shays-Meehan Campaign Finance Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2002, at A30.
205 See supra Part III.A (expressing doubt that disclosure would survive "exacting" scrutiny).
2W The enforcement interest, of course, disappears entirely, because there is no limit to en-
force.
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The corruption potential of a $200 contribution is not greater merely
because the donor has the option to give $20,000-indeed, the con-
trary is true, because $200 becomes even less significant to a candi-
date who can gather funds efficiently from more generous contribu-
tors. Thus, at the lower end of the contribution scale, the
government interests remain as diminished as they were in Part II,
but the protection for contributions is greater, so the balance favors
anonymity even more than under the Buckley framework. At the
higher end, the balance tips.
20 7
This peculiar, bifurcated result illustrates two points: first, the dis-
closure requirement at the libertarian framework's heart is inconsis-
tent with its fundamental premise, the high First Amendment value
of political contributions; second, disclosure must be evaluated in the
context of an entire regulatory regime. Here, the elimination of con-
tribution limits alters the Buckley analysis in several respects.
2. A Regulatory Framework
Several members of the Supreme Court appear poised to allow
significantly more regulation of both contributions and expenditures
than current doctrine permits. °s They have not unified around a
single easily summarized plan like the libertarian model, but their
general principles can be thought of as the regulatory framework for
post-Buckley doctrine. As articulated by these Justices and by a distin-
guished group of scholars who share this perspective, the framework
considers more government supervision of elections justified in order
to achieve their democratic purposes.
McIntyre sends mixed signals about the extent of a regulatory
framework. It acknowledges that government interests may receive
more deference in cases involving "election code provisions govern-
ing the voting process itself."2°9 But it distinguishes the disclosure re-
quirement imposed on Mrs. McIntyre's pamphlets, because it "does
not control the mechanics of the electoral process. It is a regulation
207 Courts would need to draw some line at which the size of a contribution inflated the cor-
ruption and information interests enough to overcome strict scrutiny and justify disclosure. It is
impossible to fix a number in such a hypothetical situation, without either a factual record or a
definitive statement of the libertarian framework; given the strict scrutiny applied under the
libertarian framework, the burden would be on the government to justify whatever threshold
the legislature had selected.
208 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (laying out, in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, a more flexible approach to consti-
tutional judgments about campaign finance, which may or may not be reconcilable with Buck-
/ey); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 648-50 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (urging, in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, that limits on direct campaign
spending, at least by political parties, should be constitutional).
209 514 U.S. 334, 344 (1995).
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of pure speech. 21 ° Contributions would appear to fall between mere
electoral "mechanics" and "pure speech." Justice Ginsburg filed a
separate two-paragraph concurrence, where she hinted that her vi-
sion of a future regulatory framework might give greater latitude to
electoral disclosure than this Article has found in the Buckley frame-
work.21' Despite her support for Mrs. McIntyre's anonymity in the
circumstances of that case, she said, "In for a calf is not always in for a
cow."2 1 2 This statement, and her contrast of Mrs. McIntyre and other
lone speakers with "other, larger circumstances,"213 suggests that she
had in mind disclosure of major activity, especially by groups, and not
necessarily modest individual contributions. None of the six other
Justices who supported the judgment joined the Ginsburg concur-
214rence.
A broader-based Supreme Court opinion that suggests the Jus-
tices' thinking about the regulatory framework-without focusing on
disclosure-is Justice Breyer's concurrence in Shrink Missouri, whichJustice G sburg also signed.2 15  He emphasized that limits on cam-
paign contributions "seek to protect the integrity of the electoral
process-the means through which a free society democratically
translates political speech into concrete governmental action ....
Under these circumstances, a presumption against constitutionality is
out of place."21 6 In this view, the design of a fair and democratic elec-
tion system is a constitutional task, and its importance may sometimes
outweigh political contributors' individual First Amendment inter-
ests. 217 While Justice Breyer indicated that his approach could be rec-
210 Id. at 345. As noted earlier, the majority opinion also attempted to distinguish electoral
disclosure on various other grounds. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
211 514 U.S. at 358 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("We do not thereby hold that the State
may not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing
its identity.").
212 Id.
213 Id. at 358 & nn.1-2.
214 Id. at 358. Justice Ginsburg signed the six-vote majority opinion. Id. at 335. The seventh
vote came from Justice Thomas, who concurred separately on originalist grounds. Id. at 358-71
(ThomasJ., concurring in the judgment).
215 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
216 Id. at 401. For another statement of Justice Breyer's views on the proper framework for
campaign finance jurisprudence, see Breyer, supra note 66, at 250-56.
217 See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 399-400 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("On the one hand,
a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern ....
[O]n the other hand, restrictions upon [contributions] seek to protect the integrity of the elec-
toral process ... ."); Breyer, supra note 66, at 253 (stating that First Amendment issues should
be considered with regard to any "negative impact on the ability of some to engage in as much
communication as they wish and the positive impact upon the public's ... ability to communi-
cate through... the electoral process"); Hasen, supra note 168, at 498-99, 505-08 (discussing
the implications of Breyer concurrence).
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onciled with the Buckley framework, he also stated outright that if it
could not, then the Court would need to "reconsider" Buckley.1
These Justices are at an early stage of conceptualizing the bounda-
ries of permissible regulation if Buckley were replaced. We can aug-
ment our understanding of the regulatory framework by turning to a
diverse group of scholars who have worked to develop this theory fur-
ther.1 While there are important differences between the various
judicial and academic articulations of this idea, the discussion here
will concentrate on their common points.
The commentators echo Justice Breyer, but perhaps go somewhat
further, by viewing an election as a bounded realm subject to differ-
ent First Amendment rules.22 0 Because the electoral process has spe-
cial purposes as a method of selecting leaders and setting policies in
our democracy, this argument runs, the government may superin-
tend it so that it can perform these functions fairly and openly. Such
oversight lends legitimacy to the election's outcomes and the result-
ing governmental decisions that bind the entire electorate.2 2 1 As C.
Edwin Baker put it, in language very close to Justice Breyer's, elec-
tions are the "structured sluices through which public opinion flows
when being converted into political power.,
2 2 2
Proponents garner support from many Supreme Court decisions
which allow the government to regulate election processes in ways
that might otherwise infringe on First Amendment rights, from be-
218 Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 404-05 (Breyer, J., concurring).
29 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 112 (arguing that "electoral speech" should be considered part
of the "electoral process" rather than "political speech"); Briffault, supra note 27 (proposing a
new definition of "election-related" speech); Dworkin, supra note 194 (arguing against the Buck-
ley opinion in light of "the defects of our democracy"); Burt Neuborne, Soft Landings, in IF BUCK-
LEY FELL, supra note 194, at 169 (discussing the effects of overturning Buckley on free speech);
Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX.
L. REv. 1803 (1999) (discussing whether or not campaign contributions should be considered
speech for First Amendment purposes).
20 Baker, for example, compares treatment of speech in the "institutionally bound" domain
of an election campaign to regulation of unconstitutional conditions, forum doctrine, and time,
place, and manner restrictions. Baker, supra note 112, at 16-21; see also Schauer & Pildes, supra
note 219, at 1835 ("But if electoral speech can be seen as a relatively distinct domain, then it
would be intellectually plausible to press for its regulation with less threat to the uniqueness of
American free speech culture.").
22 See Briffault, supra note 27, at 1764-65 ("[E]lectoral outcomes govern the entire polity, the
losers as well as the winners .... [This] creates the need for rules that both protect the rights
of individuals and ensure the fairness and integrity of the process as a whole, thus enhancing
the democratic legitimacy of the government that results.").
2n Baker, supra note 112, at 34. Baker draws heavily on Jurgen Habermas's concept of a
broad "lifeworld" in which persons conduct most of their meaningful daily interactions, and a
narrower institutionalized "systems realm" in which the experiences and opinions formed in the
lifeworld are transformed into action, including law. Id. at 37-45 (citing JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996)).
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coming involved with the internal affairs of political parties, 23 to ban-
ning campaign speech within one hundred feet of a polling place, 24
to picking and choosing among candidates to speak in a government-
sponsored election debate.25 The notion of a bounded realm will be
tested again in McConnell, where plaintiffs challenge provisions of the
McCain-Feingold Act that restrict issue advocacy advertisements im-
mediately before elections. 26
Accounts of a post-Buckley framework with greater latitude for gov-
ernment regulation of elections would not, by any means, ignore the
speech interests of participants in the electoral process. 7 At most,
they would place comparatively more weight on the societal-interest
side of the scale, and less on the individual-rights side. All of the
scholars who pursue this rationale carefully draw lines to limit the
incursion into nonelectoral expression and association.2 8  It is not
clear whether a rule requiring disclosure of contributions, despite
significant privacy costs, would lie within the government's enhanced
power in this bounded realm. An examination of the deeper under-
lying purposes for greater government authority over elections sug-
gests that much mandatory disclosure (although, again, not all) con-
tradicts those purposes.
Perhaps the single greatest motivation for the regulatory frame-
work is an enhanced conception of the interests in information dur-
ing an election. The proponents of this view see the election as a
temporary civic moment of transparency, during which maximizing
information increases the legitimacy of the voting process, and
thereby the choices that result. As Richard Briffault has framed it,
voters "set the course of government for the next political term.
There is a collective interest in increasing the amount of relevant in-
formation available to the voters in the hope of improving the quality
23 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (permitting the
prohibition of fusion candidacies); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (banning an informal
"white primary" that effectively selected the Democratic nominee who was then assured of vic-
tory in one-party Texas).
24 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). Justice Breyer also cited Freeman. See Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
225 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that a candi-
date debate required a different constitutional analysis than other programming on a govern-
ment-controlled public television station because of the special election context).
26 See Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88-90 (2002); Briffault, supra note 27, at 1776-
98 (discussing the constitutionality of such express advocacy limits with reference to bounded
realm analysis).
27 See Baker, supra note 112, at 51 (arguing that the bounded realm conception does not
"abandon constitutional protection for speech in the campaign context").
228 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 27, at 1791-98 (tailoring rules to minimize the speech-
restrictive impact of limits on "issue advocacy" advertising aimed at electioneering); Schauer &
Pildes, supra note 219, at 1824-30 (exploring the acceptable placement of the line between the
electoral realm and other political speech by analyzing the impact on freedom of speech).
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of collective decision-making."229 For Briffault, this interest justifies
judicial deference to legislatively-imposed disclosure requirements
because they help voters make wise choices.
This souped-up information interest remains vulnerable to the
same criticisms made earlier of the Buckley information interest: dif-
fuse and hard-to-digest data, concerning modest-sized individual con-
tributions made for various unknowable reasons, adds little "relevant
information" to a voter's decision-making process. 30 Mrs. McIntyre's
identity was more informative to the reader of her pamphlet than to
the voter surfing the Web and learning about her contributions to
candidates. Yet the Court backed Mrs. McIntyre's interest in anonym-
ity over the voter's interest in disclosure. This is so even though the
Ohio law was itself specifically limited to the bounded realm of elec-
tions (in that case, a local referendum).2 3 1  A supporter of the
bounded realm might argue that McIntyre and the other anonymity
cases were wrongly decided, but their assessment of the true benefit
to voters of other speakers' identities (and by extension individual
contributors' identities) remains compelling.
On the cost side, deterrence of contributions should be a particu-
larly significant problem with disclosure rules under a bounded
realm theory.32 Baker, who has advanced one of the most interven-
tionist versions of the regulatory framework, warned that in order to
stay consistent with his rationale for government intervention, courts
should "strike down regulations that restrict the democratic charac-
ter-the openness, fairness, or effectiveness-of the electoral proc-
ess."23 The deterrent effect of contribution disclosure would restrict
rather than expand access to the electoral process.234 Indeed, it may
block the only avenue available for some individuals-those who wish
to exercise control over their exposure to the world-to participate in
this democratic electoral realm. 3 Worst of all, the uneven nature of
this chilling effect distorts the content of political discourse and de-
2 Briffault, supra note 27, at 1773.
230 See supra Part II.A.2.
231 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1995). A broader law requir-
ing that all pamphlets be signed had already been overturned. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960). Thus the only hope for Ohio to preserve its law was a claim that disclosure in the lim-
ited realm of elections should be handled differently. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344-45.
232 On the deterrence of contributions caused by disclosure rules, see supra Part I.C.
233 Baker, supra note 112, at 51.
2 Baker addresses the point directly and seems to agree that, at least in some circumstances,
government regulation of the electoral sphere should not extend to stripping the right of ano-
nymity from protected speech. See id. at 28 n.111, 46 & n.165 ("[W]hen willingness to partici-
pate is reasonably and predictably dependent on anonymity, laws requiring the disclosure of
identity are presumptively unconstitutional.").
235 Cf supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional difference be-
tween anonymity-stripping through law and through physical exposure).
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tracts from the regulatory framework's central3goal of reflecting au-
thentic public opinion in the electoral process.
In addition, under a regulatory framework the government would
enjoy many other tools to promote the democratic purposes of elec-
tions. Flat limits on either contributions or expenditures still allow all
individuals (and organizations) to engage in some amount of effec-
tive speech, on an equal footing, without penalties being imposed by
the legal system. Perhaps most significantly, the law could restrict
express advocacy more comprehensively than the traditional under-
standing of the Buckley framework would allow. 237 Admittedly, the
bounded realm rationale imposes no fornal "least restrictive means"
requirement when analyzing disclosure rules. But if the government
had the authority to intervene more directly, with measures such as
expenditure caps and express advocacy limits, the necessity of an in-
direct tool like disclosure becomes harder to defend.
This would especially be true of modest contributions. It seems
odd to argue that, in order to preserve equal and fair access to the
democratic forum of an election, Mrs. McIntyre must open her po-
litical convictions to public view as the price of admission. The pri-
vacy costs imposed on small contributors discussed in Part I would
still exist, they would still deter-and they would be less justifiable as
a trade off against other policy goals when they could be so easily
avoided through a wide range of other available regulation.
Because it emphasizes flexibility and deference to legislatures in
running elections, the regulatory framework would present the fewest
formal constitutional obstacles to disclosure rules. Nonetheless, sup-
porters of a framework grounded in concern for equal participation
should also be concerned about rules that restrict and deter some
contributors but not others. The information interest they espouse
can be better served by forms of disclosure that do not impinge on
information privacy. I begin the project of identifying these in the
next Part.
IV. TOWARD A PRIVACY-SENSITIVE DISCLOSURE POLICY
Part I delineated serious privacy costs which call into question the
policy wisdom of maintaining current campaign contribution disclo-
sure requirements. Part III suggested that these rules may also be
unconstitutional. That leaves the question of what could replace
them. The purposes of informing voters and preventing corruption
236 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing how the chilling effect of disclo-
sure favors those with orthodox views).
237 See Briffault, supra note 27, at 1776-98 (discussing the constitutionality of express advocacy
limits with reference to bounded realm analysis).
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remain-weaker than commonly assumed, as Part II explained, but
real nonetheless. This final Part suggests alternatives for more pri-
vacy-sensitive disclosure regimes that still serve much of the purpose
of disclosure. Having raised the privacy problems with broad manda-
tory disclosure, this Article will do no more than sketch some possible
approaches, but it is important to demonstrate that alternatives ex-
ist. 
38
To overcome objections to privacy costs, it is not sufficient simply
to point at the drawbacks of protecting contribution privacy. Data
privacy frequently imposes burdens on other values.2 3 ' The availabil-
ity of personal data reduces the transaction costs of cumbersome in-
formation-gathering and avoids externalizing costs based on any re-
sulting gaps in information.2 40  Richard Posner has long argued that
the ability of individuals to shield data about themselves from others
leads to imbalances in all kinds of daily interactions with people who
would respond differently if they had full information.41
The law routinely balances these burdens against privacy costs,
and reaches different conclusions in different situations. We allow
lenders to demand extensive personal information from prospective
borrowers, in part because we recognize that loans would become
more expensive for everyone if lenders could not adjust their interest
rates to account for individual credit risks. This may seem intuitive,
yet we limit the ability of health insurers to use personal information
of beneficiaries in the same way. These restrictions lead to the same
predictable externalization-everyone's premiums go up to protect
privacy-but we have made a normative policy choice based in part
on the sensitivity of the data.
As technology and culture increase the availability of personal in-
formation, public willingness to make such sacrifices for information
238 See Garrett, supra note 3, at 1012 ("The choice ... is not between no disclosure and full
disclosure. Rather, policymakers need to determine what information should be disclosed and
in what form.").
2,39 See generally McGeveran, supra note 66, at 1822-26 (discussing the burdens of data privacy
in a variety of settings).
240 See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 30-31 (1997) ("Instant credit, better
targeted mass mailings, lower insurance rates, faster service when ordering merchandise by tele-
phone, special recognition for frequent travelers, and countless other benefits come only at the
expense of some degree of privacy.").
241 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 333 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (arguing that the
value of "prying," for both commercial and personal reasons, should be weighed against the
value of privacy in economic analysis); Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393
(1978) (making the same argument); see also SOLVEIG SINGLETON, CATO INST., PRIVACY AS
CENSORSHIP: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF PROPOSALS TO REGULATE PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 8-
13, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-295es.html (Jan. 22, 1998) (describing the economic
function of personal data).
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privacy has increased. In response, the law has more frequently
tilted the scales toward privacy, despite the burdens of doing so.
These changes were not constitutionally required, because, unlike
contribution disclosure, the privacy costs involved did not implicate
244the First Amendment under current doctrine. They were policy re-
sponses to a growing problem of the information age.
By thinking creatively, however, the sacrifices required to protect
information privacy can be minimized. For instance, businesses faced
with more stringent protection of privacy for commercial information
in other parts of the world are learning to adjust to the burdens. 45
Likewise with campaign contribution disclosure. Even if we are not
constitutionally compelled to do so, a new awareness of privacy costs
should spur us to think creatively about ways to minimize intrusion
on information privacy but preserve the perceived benefits of disclo-
sure.
Many of the goals of disclosure, such as deterring corruption and
providing information, can be advanced through other regulatory
techniques without any sacrifice of data privacy at all. Public financ-
ing might be the most comprehensive approach. There are also con-
tribution limits, independent advocacy restrictions, ballot access laws,
and many more. Furthermore, the disclosure of political activity by
organizations does not implicate the problems documented in Part I
because privacy is an individual interest.2 46 Thus there is no privacy-
related objection to a requirement that the First National Bank or the
NAACP reveal contributions and expenditures 47 (unless they must
242 A referendum last year in North Dakota illustrated public willingness to make such pri-
vacy-protecting trade offs. Seventy-two percent of those voting supported a measure to tighten
financial privacy rules, despite a pervasive advertising campaign by opponents (who outspent
supporters six to one) featuring ominous images of walls encircling the state's borders and
warnings that banks would leave North Dakota if forced to adhere to tighter rules. See Adam
Clymer, North Dakota Tightens Law on Bank Data and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at A28;
Caroline Daniel, North Dakota Guards Its Privacy Against Free Trade in Financial Data, FIN. TIMES,
June 27, 2002, at 2.
243 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (citing numerous examples).
244 Recall that the Supreme Court refused to find an inherent constitutional right to data
privacy in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), although there are persuasive arguments that
such a right does exist. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
245 The European Union has stricter information privacy rules than any jurisdiction in the
United States. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. Paired with creative
thinking, technology can be an aid rather than an obstacle in this endeavor. See generally
McGeveran, supra note 66 (advocating a combination of legal, market, and technological ap-
proaches to protect privacy on the World Wide Web).246
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Section 527 disclosure require-
ments); supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (discussing the unique status of corporate
contributions in election law).
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also divulge the names of individuals who gave them money2 48). Un-
der a regulatory framework, the number of non-disclosure options
would grow even larger.249
A more radical approach, advanced by Ackerman and Ayres,
would replace mandatory disclosure of campaign contributions with
mandatory anonymity. 2° Their provocative proposal is motivated by
the elimination of the corrupting influence of contributions rather
than by privacy concerns. Under their elaborate plan, contributions
could be made only through intermediaries that conceal the donor's
identity, even from the candidate. They reason that candidates can-
not be beholden to donors whose identities they do not know.51
Whatever its effectiveness in fighting corruption, this scheme would
certainly protect privacy better than disclosure. 52 While the idea
seems farfetched, that is largely because it contradicts our unthinking
embrace of sunlight. After all, we take the privacy of the voting booth
for granted today,52 but the secret ballot is a radical reform of very
recent vintage; it swept the nation in a wave of progressive zeal in the
late nineteenth century.54 That reform was also motivated by a desire
to fight corruption, not to protect privacy. 5 Perhaps someday we will
feel the same about the privacy of contributions as we do about the
secret ballot.
We can, however, make strides toward privacy-sensitive disclosure
rules without such a dramatic paradigm shift. First, as noted repeat-
edly in this Article, relatively large contributions present a stronger
case for the government's corruption and information interests. Dis-
closure policy that concentrated on these contributions would do
248 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that the NAACP did not have to dis-
close information about its members to the state of Alabama).
249 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
250 ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3; see supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting the
proposal and critiques of it).
251 The Ackerman and Ayres proposal has generated extensive commentary. See supra note
30. I only consider it from the vantage of data privacy.
252 A scheme that prevented contributors from disclosing information about themselves
might be objectionable, because it would limit choice over the selective revelation of political
convictions. The detailed design of the model alleviates this concern. A contributor can claim
to have contributed to a candidate, just as a voter can claim to have pulled the lever for a par-
ticular candidate. The intermediaries would be arranged, however, so that the donor could not
prove the fact, rendering a claim of having supported a candidate financially-like a claim of
having cast a vote for a candidate-nothing more than "cheap talk." ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra
note 3, at 6, 28-30; Ayres & Bulow, supra note 30, at 855.
23 See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 30, at 838-39 (noting that voting without secret ballots was
commonplace until reforms were enacted).
254 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200-02 (1992) (describing the history of the secret
ballot).
25 For an intriguing and informative summary of the history of the secret ballot as a response
to widespread corruption, and perhaps a means of entrenching certain established interests, see
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 160, at 348-52.
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more to advance those interests, while protecting the privacy of most
individual contributors. 256 Reformers who are serious about privacy
should get to work producing the empirical evidence needed to de-
termine at what level benefits outweigh costs. 257 In lieu of such evi-
dence, the current regime relies on unexamined assumptions about
the value of sunlight, even for small contributions. These assump-
tions may turn out to be true, on further consideration, in the (rela-
tively rare) case of large individual contributions.
Additional disclosure also might occur through informal norms
rather than formal law. Of course, individuals are always free to dis-
close their own political contributions. Protection of expression, af-
ter all, is the whole purpose of anonymity, and information privacy
protects an interest in choice rather than imposing secrecy.25 s Scat-
tered voluntary disclosures do not harm privacy, but they are unlikely
to advance information or corruption interests. More significantly, if
the government did not provide data on particular contributors, me-
dia outlets and good-government organizations might pressure can-
didates to release their full campaign finance reports, including de-
tails about their contributors. Candidates currently provide their
personal tax returns to journalists so routinely that a refusal to do so
is often newsworthy.259 Since the law would continue to require re-
porting to the government even without public disclosure, candi-
dates and PACs would possess detailed reports that could be shared
with reporters easily. This practice would erode privacy by imposing
many of the same costs discussed in Part I. In some ways it would be
worse, because contributors would not know in advance whether
their data would remain private or not. Some rules might be neces-
2, See Garrett, supra note 3, at 1042 ("[S] mall contributions and expenditures are not gener-
ally informative to voters . . ").
257 Reformers have risen to this challenge in the case of issue advocacy by producing empiri-
cal evidence of the problems of "sham" issue advocacy. See HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note
25; Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth, supra note 27.
258 See Steven Hetcher, Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1916, 1932-
34 (2000) (reviewing LESSIG, supra note 100); Kang, supra note 51, at 1266 ("[C]ontrol is at the
heart of information privacy .... If the individual wants to exercise that control by disclosing
information [he should be able to]."); McGeveran, supra note 66, at 1837-38 ("Respect for
autonomy requires not only the freedom to keep personal data private, but also the freedom to
disclose it ."); cf supra note 252 (discussing this issue in relation to the Ackerman and Ayres
proposal).
259 See, e.g., Halbfinger, supra note 149 (recounting how Senator Jon S. Corzine's opponent
succeeded in pressuring him to release details of his tax returns and charitable contributions);
Dean E. Murphy & Eric Lipton, Bloomberg Discloses He's Rich, But He's Frugal with Details, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2001, at Al (recounting the pressure on New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, a
billionaire, to release more information about his personal finances than was legally required
during his campaign); Editorial, The Bloomberg Factor, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A14 (criticiz-
ing Bloomberg for failure to release full personal tax returns).
260 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (distinguishing reporting from disclosure).
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sary to address this problem.2 ' At least norms would involve no state
action, however, and probably no central Web site of all contribu-
tions.
Regulations other than disclosure, perhaps coupled with disclo-
sure of especially large contributions, would prove adequate to meet
the goals of disclosure while protecting information privacy. If not,
however, I would suggest an additional option-aggregate disclosure
of more modest contributions. As we have seen, a single contribution
of a few hundred dollars standing alone provides little meaningful in-
formation. The context of other contributions, however, may cause
informative patterns to emerge.262 Government agencies such as the
FEC, rather than disseminating full raw data about individual named
contributors, could instead reveal statistics such as the total amount
of money and the total number of contributions that each candidate
and PAC has received from certain categories of sources. An agency
could report on categories such as zip code and occupational
group-and if other information would be helpful, the law could re-
quire contributors to provide it.2 63  Personalized data would be un-
available to the general public, almost eliminating privacy 
costs. 26 4
Paired with disclosure of individual large contributions, such a re-
gime might actually provide more useful data than the current sys-
tem, and do so without naming names.
The Census Bureau is a model for a government agency that dis-
closes enormously informative aggregate data, while observing a strict
26 Of course, adopting a rule that forbade candidates from releasing the names of contribu-
tors who gave modest amounts, or perhaps only those who affirmatively opted out of disclosure
by requesting privacy, would prevent this problem. But partial or redacted lists might distort
the overall pattern of contributions received, replacing information with misinformation. See
Harvard Note, supra note 28, at 1522 (warning of the danger of selective disclosure). A better
rule would simply prohibit candidates from divulging the information at all. Given the domi-
nant rhetoric of sunlight, such a regime is admittedly far away. This discussion of informal dis-
closure norms highlights a common genie-out-of-the-bottle problem with privacy protection:
once a set of data such as a list of contributors is generated, and someone is curious about its
content, keeping it private becomes very difficult.
262 The energy that private groups devote to categorizing contribution data, see supra notes
59-61 and accompanying text, suggests the importance of such value-added presentations of
contribution data. See generally supra note 133 and accompanying text.
263 Federal law now defines the required "identification" of an individual contributor as in-
cluding the "name, the mailing address, and the occupation of such individual, as well as the
name of his or her employer." 2 U.S.C. § 431(13) (A) (2003). This definition could be ex-
panded to allow disclosure of other useful data that would be reported in the aggregate. With
privacy assured, the data might even include potentially sensitive classifications, such as race or
party registration, if aggregate data on them would help voters evaluate candidates.
264 Of course, there are privacy costs associated with government collection of information.
In this context, however, the privacy costs of reporting are much lower than the costs associated
with public disclosure, andjustifiable as essential tools to enforce campaign contribution limits.
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legal ban on revealing private information about individuals. 6 5 There
is reason to be optimistic that the FEC could handle this task, despite
its other problems. Even harsh critics of the agency admit that it ad-
ministers disclosure rules fairly effectively.266 This approach depends
on an adequate level of funding for election agencies, although pri-
vate groups could perhaps be enlisted to help if they were required to
respect the privacy of individual names.6' None of these compro-
mise approaches is perfect. They all sacrifice both some privacy and
some ability to advance corruption and information interests. The
current system, in contrast, virtually ignores privacy costs-and none-
theless does an imperfect job of advancing the other interests.
Judges, legislators, regulators, and advocates should all be thinking
more carefully and creatively about how to achieve the right balance
between privacy and disclosure in our electoral system.
CONCLUSION
This Article has a modest goal. It identifies and explores the col-
lective cognitive dissonance we indulge when we sing the praises of
disclosure in some areas of our political discourse and warn of the
dangers of exposure in other areas. Current contribution disclosure
rules cannot be fully reconciled with cases such as McIntyre and Watch-
tower, try as one might to distinguish them. Instead, we should assess
honestly the costs of ubiquitous Internet access to any federal politi-
cal contribution over $200 (and even smaller contributions to many
state and local campaigns). Having done so, we may find ourselves
freed to think more creatively about campaign finance rules that
achieve their goals while respecting information privacy. There
are few tasks in a democracy more important than ensuring that elec-
tions embody our highest ideals of fairness, openness, equality, and
robust debate. Many proposed changes in campaign finance rules
would bring our flawed electoral processes closer to this aspiration.
Disclosing the modest political contributions of the nation's Mrs.
265 See 13 U.S.C. §§ 9, 214 (2003) (establishing the confidentiality requirement for census
data and penalties for violations); supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing census and
tax forms).
2 See, e.g.,Jackson, supra note 6, at 321 ("The FEC is generally praised for its handling of this
public information, but even here improvements could be made."). Like most proponents of
disclosure, Jackson would improve disclosure at the FEC by increasing it. Id. But see CAMPAIGN
FIN. INST. TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE, supra note 47, at 23-25 (suggesting remedies for short-
comings in FEC Web site, centered on the accuracy of raw data and increasing site's user-
friendliness).
267 In Virginia, for example, a nonprofit organization formed to put a database of state cam-
paign contributions on the Web receives funding from state government, media organizations,
and private donors, and works with state legislators and regulators. See Virginia Public Access
Project, History, at http://www.vpap.org/about/history.cfm (last visitedJuly 31, 2003).
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McIntyres, however, advances these goals very little, and harms them
a fair amount.
SYMPOSIUM
MCCONNELL V. FEC:
UNDERSTANDING THE DECISION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOREWORD
Nathaniel Persil
On May 2, 2003, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia released its decision in McConnell v. FEC,1 adjudging the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.2 In four
opinions stretching 1638 pages, the three judges considering the case
created more legal questions than they answered. In a symposium
that took place on May 15, 2003, legal scholars, political scientists,
and other campaign finance experts convened at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School to explain and critique the various opinions
in the case. Selected remarks from that "live" symposium appear in
the pages that follow.
The first panel of lawyers and law professors attempted to explain
the court's decision. Speaking on that panel were Professor Richard
Briffault, Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legisla-
tion at Columbia Law School; Trevor Potter, former Commissioner
and Chairman of the Federal Election Commission, Chair and Gen-
eral Counsel of the Campaign Legal Center, and Member of the law
firm Caplin & Drysdale; and Robert F. Bauer, the Office Managing
Partner and Chair of the Political Law Group in the Washington,
D.C. office of Perkins Coie.
The second panel, which was chaired by Professor Roy A. Schot-
land of Georgetown University Law Center, critiqued the decision.
The following law professors appeared on that panel: Burt Neub-
orne, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law and Legal Director of
the Brennan Center forJustice at New York University School of Law;
Daniel R. Ortiz, John Allan Love Professor of Law at the University of
Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (threejudge court), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 2268 (2003)
(mem.).
2 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
